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Innovation’s Hidden Externalities
Stephanie Plamondon Bair*
When commentators discuss innovation’s externalities, they
often classify them into one of two categories. On the positive
externalities, or “spillovers” side, legal and economics scholars
often speak of the benefits innovation confers on other innovators.
Future innovators profit from past innovation as they “stand on
the shoulders of giants” to develop progressively new and better
innovation. Discussion of innovation’s negative externalities, on
the other hand, has mainly focused on social harms not directly
related to future innovation that particular advances impose on
third parties—the classic example being pollution. Thus, the
common understanding is that innovation’s spillovers positively
impact innovation (among other things), while innovation’s
negative externalities are only indirectly related to society’s
collective capacity for further innovation, if at all.
This Article challenges that view, arguing that innovation
does impose negative externalities on contemporary and future
innovators, thereby making it more difficult for them to innovate.
It discusses three mechanisms by which these negative
externalities arise. The first is through path dependencies. Path
dependencies in innovation can limit the innovative potential of
other innovators by effectively foreclosing particular areas of
study or by directing innovation along less productive paths. A
second mechanism by which innovation imposes negative
externalities on other innovators is through the workings of social
norms. Social norms that become entrenched in innovative
communities can lead innovators to adopt sub-optimal research
agendas and methodologies. Third, particular innovations may
*Associate Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School. Thanks to Clark Asay,
Chris Buccafusco, Dan Burk, Michael Burstein, Margaret Chon, Brett Frischmann, Eric
Goldman, Hank Greely, Dmitry Karshtedt, Aaron Nielson, Lisa Ouellette, Michael Risch,
Heidi Williams, Felix Wu, participants in the Law and STEM Junior Scholars Forum at
Stanford Law School, the Stanford Law and Biosciences Colloquium, the George Washington
University IP Colloquium, the BioLawlapalooza Conference at Stanford Law School, the
Cardozo Intellectual Property Colloquium, and the Intellectual Property Scholars
Conference at DePaul Law School for helpful comments and feedback. Many thanks to Clint
Saylor for excellent research assistance.

1385

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:5 (2022)

work on those who adopt them at a psychological level, changing
their cognition and thought processes in ways that negatively
impact their future ability to innovate.
Uncovering innovation’s hidden externalities has
implications for discussions of innovation policy. Currently, the
conventional wisdom holds that innovation’s spillovers should be
addressed through innovation subsidies, while innovation’s
negative externalities can be addressed by taxing the externalities
directly. Recognizing that innovation has both positive and
negative externalities for contemporary and future innovators,
however, challenges the view that the conversation about
innovation subsidies (like intellectual property, tax breaks, grants,
and prizes) should concern itself only with innovation’s
spillovers, and not with its negative externalities.
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INTRODUCTION
There are few things society celebrates more highly than
innovation. Innovation drives economic growth, producing wealth
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and raising the standard of living.1 Particular innovations
contribute further to the social welfare by reducing disease,
prolonging life, increasing leisure time, and providing
entertainment, among other things.2
Given this, it’s not surprising that scholars and policymakers
spend significant time and money considering and implementing
policies to promote innovation. For example, much attention has
been devoted to policy levers like intellectual property (IP) regimes,
grants, prizes, and research and development (R&D) tax credits,
with the goal of leveraging these mechanisms to generate optimal
levels of innovation.
But when innovation does occur, which policymakers hope it
will, an important question arises about the downstream effects of
this innovation on society’s ability to continue to generate yet more
socially beneficial innovation. Innovation is not an isolated, onetime event. What, then, are the dynamics of innovation?3
The conventional wisdom holds that innovation tends to give
rise to more innovation in a positive feedback cycle, as society
makes use of new innovation to develop progressively more and
better innovation.4 This idea is often expressed in economic terms
as innovation giving rise to spillovers, or positive externalities, for

1. See, e.g., W. BRIAN ARTHUR, THE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT
EVOLVES 10 (Simon & Schuster 2009); RICHARD R. NELSON, THE SOURCES OF ECONOMIC
GROWTH 31 (1996) (“Virtually all scholars of productivity growth now agree on the central
role of technological advance.”); Paul M. Romer, Two Strategies for Economic Development:
Using Ideas and Producing Ideas, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE
ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1992, at 63–64 (Lawrence H. Summers & Shekhar Shah
eds., 1993).
2. ARTHUR, supra note 1, at 11.
3. See Zachary Liscow & Quentin Karpilow, Innovation Snowballing and Climate Law,
95 WASH. U. L. REV. 387, 392 (discussing how conventional views of innovation policy
“miss[] the dynamics of innovation”).
4. Russell Golman & Steven Klepper, Spinoffs and Clustering, in INNOVATION SYSTEMS,
POLICY AND MANAGEMENT (Jorge Niosi ed., 2018); see also John Villasenor, The Future of
Innovation: Five Things We Can Learn From Bitcoin, FORBES (May 12, 2014, 4:29 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnvillasenor/2014/05/12/the-future-of-innovation-fivethings-we-can-learn-from-bitcoin (“Much has been written about how innovation centers
such as Silicon Valley, where a high concentration of talent, venture capital, and successful
technology companies creates a positive feedback cycle that begets more talent, investment,
and success stories.”).
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third-party innovators, who build on and benefit from the work of
earlier innovators.5
In terms of the dynamic effects of innovation then, it is
understood that innovation gives rise to innovation-promoting
positive externalities. But what has been largely overlooked is the
possibility that innovation may give rise to innovation-inhibiting
negative externalities as well. Instead, the discussion of
innovation’s negative externalities has focused for the most part on
social harms, largely unrelated to future impacts on the collective
capacity for innovation, that arise from the use of specific
innovations—harms like pollution, for example.6 Due to this
oversight, discussions concerned with addressing innovation’s
externalities have centered mainly on how best to approach
innovation spillovers so as to properly incentivize the optimal
amount of innovation through innovation subsidies,7 while
employing other policies (primarily taxation) to mitigate the
negative, non-innovation-related externalities these innovations
produce. But this discussion would shift dramatically if it were
recognized that innovation gives rise to both positive and negative
externalities borne by other innovators.
This Article argues that innovation does in fact trigger negative
externalities for innovators and outlines three mechanisms by
which it may do so. The first is through path dependencies.

5. See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law, 21
RAND J. ECON. 131, 132 (1990) (“Disclosing technical information confers a positive
externality on a firm’s competitors[.]”); Adam B. Jaffe, Richard G. Newell & Robert N.
Stavins, Technology Policy for Energy and the Environment, in 4 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE
ECONOMY 35, 39 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2004) (“[I]nnovation creates
positive externalities in the form of knowledge spillovers for other firms[.]”); Lisa Grow Sun
& Brigham Daniels, Mirrored Externalities, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 146 (2014)
(“Individuals who exercise and share their creativity . . . generate innumerable positive
externalities. In the case of inventions, for instance . . . other inventors may build on the initial
innovation to create new and different products.”); Gregory N. Mandel, Proxy Signals:
Capturing Private Information for Private Benefit, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2012) (“In the
case of innovation, positive externalities are legion. The positive externalities, or spillovers,
of innovation include third-party benefits from the chance to improve upon an innovation
(and profit thereby), [and] the opportunity for others affiliated with innovation to learn from
an innovation and transfer that know-how to other projects[.]”).
6. See, e.g., Jaffe et al., supra note 5, at 35 (“New technologies may create or facilitate
increased pollution[.]”).
7. See, e.g., Scotchmer & Green, supra note 5, at 132 (stating that “[d]isclosing technical
information confers a positive externality on a firm’s competitors, which the firm might want
to avoid[,]” and discussing how patentability requirements can provide appropriate
incentives to firms concerned with these spillovers).
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Economists have detailed how innovation’s future, like other social
phenomena, is subject to its past. For example, Zachary Liscow and
Quentin Karpilow have coined the term “innovation snowballing”
to refer to economists’ finding that past innovation can guide future
innovation in particular directions by making certain innovative
choices more valuable.8 As Liscow and Karpilow point out in the
context of clean versus dirty energy technologies, the resulting
trajectory might not always be the most socially beneficial one.9
More generally, however, path dependencies in innovation can
impact third-party innovators by effectively foreclosing particular
areas of innovation or by directing their innovation along less
productive paths.
A second, related mechanism by which innovation may limit
other innovators is through the workings of “anti-innovation
norms.”10 Innovation occurs mainly in communities,11 and
innovative communities are subject to social norms and pressures.
These norms can lead innovators to adopt particular research
agendas and methodologies based on their social consequences
rather than their projected impact on future innovation
trajectories.12 These innovative choices, in turn, could limit other
innovators. An example of anti-innovation norms at work can be
seen in the results of a recent study finding that the death of a leader
in an academic field actually leads to a surge in highly cited
contributions from others that “rejuvenates a research field with
new . . . ideas.”13 Presumably, the social influence of the leader had
a stifling effect on both the quantity and quality of research being
produced prior to the leader’s death.
Finally, particular innovations may work on those who adopt
them at a psychological level, changing their cognition and thought
processes in ways that affect their future ability to think creatively
8. Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 3, at 389.
9. Id. at 404–14.
10. Stephanie Plamondon Bair & Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Anti-Innovation Norms, 112
NW. U. L. REV. 1069, 1073 (2018).
11. See, e.g., Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Innovation Inc., 32 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 713,
717 (2017).
12. Bair & Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 10, at 1074.
13. Tyler Smith, Scientific Progress One Funeral at a Time: What Happens to a Research
Field When It Loses Its Leader?, AM. ECON. ASS’N (Sept. 13, 2019),
https://www.aeaweb.org/research/scientific-advancement-eminent-deaths (reporting on
Pierre Azoulay, Christian Fons-Rosen & Joshua S. Graff Zivin, Does Science Advance One
Funeral at a Time?, 109 AM. ECON. REV. 2889 (2019)).
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and innovate. For example, repeated use of certain types of
innovations may alter brain architecture and function in ways that
decrease attention span and information filtering capability—
cognitive abilities crucial for creative thinking. Engagement with
these innovations also seems to interfere with the development and
maintenance of emotional intelligence, which is strongly correlated
with creativity. Present innovation may thus affect tomorrow’s
innovators by limiting their creative potential.
Recognizing that innovation gives rise to both positive and
negative externalities borne by contemporary and future
innovators has implications for discussions of innovation policy.
The conventional wisdom holds that treatment of innovation’s
spillovers and externalities are separable: spillovers can be
addressed (if necessary) through innovation subsidies, while
innovation’s negative externalities are best addressed by taxing
these externalities directly.14 But separating treatment of
innovation’s positive and negative externalities makes less sense if
they are both operating, in oppositional ways, on the same third
party—other innovators. In this case, decisions about how to
account for innovation’s spillovers benefitting other innovators
should also account for any countervailing externalities imposed
on the same group. For example, if scholars believe that to achieve
optimal levels of innovation, IP protection should be sufficiently
robust to allow innovators to capture the full social benefit
conferred on other innovators, a calculation of this benefit should
be offset by whatever harms those innovators are also imposing on
other innovators.
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines how
innovation scholars think about innovation externalities and the
dynamics of innovation. The dominant view is that innovation
gives rise to spillovers for other innovators, who build on past
advances to perpetuate a positive feedback cycle of innovation,15
while the negative externalities generated by innovation are not
directly related to the collective capacity for innovation. Part II
challenges this view by exploring the various ways in which
innovation may give rise to negative externalities that impact other
innovators. Part III explores the implications of this insight. Among

14. Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 3, at 390.
15. Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the
Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 29 (1991).
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other things, it suggests that innovation’s spillovers and
externalities should be considered together when designing
innovation policy, at least to the extent that they both impact other
innovators. It also explores what these findings may mean for
philosophical conceptions of innovation and the types of
innovation society should focus on promoting.
I. INNOVATION EXTERNALITIES: CURRENT UNDERSTANDINGS
Innovation is an iterative process.16 Today’s innovation builds
on any number of past innovations. Uber, for example, exists in part
because of the prior development of GPS, while the electric car
depends on pre-existing battery technology.17
The cumulative nature of innovation has led to a common
understanding among innovation scholars that innovation begets
further innovation, as past creations create future innovative
opportunities.18 As economist and innovation theorist W. Brian
Arthur put it in his book The Nature of Technology, “the collective of
technology builds up from itself with the agency of human
inventors and developers much as a coral reef builds itself from
itself from the activities of small organisms.”19 In other words, as
more innovations emerge, humans make use of these innovations
to develop progressively more and better additional innovations—
and the virtuous cycle continues.20
In economic terms, scholars refer to these cumulative benefits
as innovation spillovers, or positive externalities.21 Present
innovators appropriate the spillovers from past innovation as they
“stand on the shoulders of giants” and build on a foundation
created by others.22 There are multiple ways in which they do this.
16. See, e.g., id. at 29 (“Most innovators stand on the shoulders of giants, and never
more so than in the current evolution of high technologies, where almost all technical
progress builds on a foundation provided by earlier innovators.”).
17. Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 3, at 405.
18. See, e.g., Golman & Klepper, supra note 4, at 342 (“Innovation begets more
innovation in a positive feedback cycle[.]”); Villasenor, supra note 4; Liscow & Karpilow,
supra note 3, at 405 (“Innovation therefore begets more innovation[.]”).
19. Arthur, supra note 1, at 169.
20. Troy Camplin & Euel Elliott, Innovation, Complex Systems and Computation:
Technological Space and Speculations on the Future, 7 STUD. EMERGENT ORD. 184, 201–02 (2014).
21. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu, Directed Technical Change, 69 REV. ECON. STUD. 781, 793
(2002); Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 3, at 397; Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley,
Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 257–58 (2007).
22. See, e.g., Acemoglu, supra note 21, at 793; Scotchmer, supra note 15, at 29.
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Third-party innovators might benefit from spillovers at the
research and development stage as research scientists move
between firms or laboratories, bringing their knowledge with
them.23 They might benefit at later stages of research when they
gain information from other innovators in academic journals, at
scientific conferences, or by reverse engineering completed
innovations.24 Or they might benefit as they attempt to
commercialize or otherwise put past innovations into practice.25
Of course, underlying this assumption is an understanding that
innovation, like many other endeavors, is stochastic. Not every
innovative advance will give rise to immediate and valuable future
innovative returns. But in general, scholars believe in the spillover
benefits of present innovation for future innovation.
Innovation thus produces spillovers for other innovators,
benefitting them in ways not fully internalized by those producing
that innovation. For this reason, some economists and innovation
scholars believe that some form of innovation subsidy is required
to incentivize optimal levels of innovation—otherwise, innovators
unable to capture the full value of their efforts will choose not
to innovate.26
But does innovation also produce negative externalities?
Scholars have acknowledged that particular innovations do,
indeed, impose negative externalities on third parties. A classic
example of such an externality is pollution.27 Another is the
increased capacity for warfare and violence certain innovations
enable.28 These externalities, as the categorization suggests, involve
23. Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 3, at 398.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the
Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1905–06 (2013) (discussing IP’s “appropriability”
problem, wherein IP under incentivizes creations whose value cannot be fully appropriated
by the creator); Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 3, at 399. But see Frischmann & Lemley, supra
note 21, at 258 (arguing that it is not necessary to fully compensate innovators for spillovers
in order to achieve optimal levels of innovation).
27. Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 3, at 390.
28. Estelle Derclaye, Eudemonic Intellectual Property: Patents and Related Rights As
Engines of Happiness, Peace, and Sustainability, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 495, 498 (2012) (“The
simple examples of the two World Wars, pollution, and global warming are enough to prove
the point: knowledge, science, and technological progress have both positive and negative
consequences.”). Other negative externalities posed by particular innovations include the
harms innovation in antibiotics imposes on consumers in the form of increased cross-
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social harms largely borne by third parties. But what is interesting
to note about these identified externalities is that unlike
innovation’s spillovers, the third parties are not necessarily other
innovators. The harms are related only indirectly, if at all, to future
innovation. In part because of this, the conventional wisdom
suggests that policymakers address these externalities via taxation
rather than through innovation policy. Fewer scholars, however,
have considered the possibility that innovation may also give rise
to negative externalities that directly affect other innovators and
their collective capacity to innovate.29 The next Part explores
that possibility.
II. INNOVATION’S HIDDEN EXTERNALITIES
How might innovation produce negative externalities for other
innovators? There are at least three mechanisms by which this
might occur: path dependencies, anti-innovation norms, and longlasting detrimental cognitive effects of particular innovations
on creativity.
A. Path Dependencies
Innovation, like other dynamic processes, gives rise to path
dependencies, wherein the future of innovation is dictated at least
resistance, Ankur Sood & Vardaan Ahluwalia, Questioning the Justifiability of Innovation
Protection in Antimicrobial Drugs: A Law and Economics Perspective, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 181, 184 (2008) (“consumption of [antibiotic] drugs and the consequent development
of resistance in pathogens due to cross-resistance impose a negative externality upon . . .
society”), the negative externalities innovation imposes on consumers as a result of reduced
access to the innovations due to the innovations being patented, Mandel, supra note 5, at 18,
or the firms passing on the R&D costs of the innovations onto consumers, Erik Dietzenbacher
& Bart Los, Externalities of R & D Expenditures, 14 ECON. SYS. RSCH. 407, 408 (2002). See also J.J.
Voeten & W.A. Naudé, Regulating the Negative Externalities of Enterprise Cluster Innovations:
Lessons from Vietnam, 4 INNOVATION & DEV. 203, 206 (2014) (“[Negative externalities of
particular innovations] include unfavourable or even dangerous working conditions (e.g. in
recycling of heavy metals used in ICT), [and] jobless growth (e.g. through the automation
of services)[.]”).
29. A notable exception is Glynn Lunney, who has argued that innovation in
developed countries can impose negative externalities on developing countries by
disincentivizing them from engaging in further innovation due to their reliance on foreign
IP. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patents and Growth: Empirical Evidence from the States, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1467, 1490–91 (2009) (“If . . . a state’s ability to undertake future innovation . . . depends upon
a state’s active role in past innovation in the field, then licensing external patents may impair
the state’s ability to undertake future innovation in the field. . . . [A]ny one domestic firm is
unlikely to bear the full costs of the state’s dependence on external patenting, suggesting that
licensing of external patents will often entail a negative externality.”).
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in part by its past. In fact, the conventional wisdom that innovation
tends to give rise to more innovation in a positive feedback cycle is
itself an example of path dependency in innovation.30
Although many scholars have noted this positive aspect of path
dependency for innovation, few have explored whether
innovation’s path dependencies could lead to less favorable
innovation outcomes. A notable exception is the work of Zachary
Liscow and Quentin Karpilow, who have explored how a pathdependency phenomenon they term “innovation snowballing”31
could exacerbate a classic innovation externality: pollution. In
innovation snowballing, past innovation directs future innovation
by rendering certain innovative choices more valuable. Innovators
choose to pursue innovations with the greatest knowledge base,
because these innovations have the highest expected returns.32 In
the context of clean energy versus polluting technologies like fossil
fuels, Liscow and Karpilow argue that because dirty tech has had a
head start of many decades, innovation snowballing will prompt
innovators to disproportionately choose to innovate in this field.33
These path-dependent innovation decisions have consequences for
innovation externalities, leading to the generation of greater
pollution than might otherwise occur.34
Liscow and Karpilow have recognized that path dependency in
innovation has consequences for the well-documented innovation
externality of pollution. But path dependencies in innovation could
also lead to additional, under-studied externalities. Specifically,
innovation path dependencies could lead to negative consequences
for third-party innovators.
How might this occur? Precisely because innovation is an
iterative process, innovative choices of present innovators will
affect the innovative choices of future innovators35—and they
30. Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 3, at 389 (“[I]nnovation builds on itself over time,
developing path dependencies in which past innovations make present ones more valuable . . . .”).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 405.
33. Id. at 407–08.
34. See id. at 394 (“Innovation snowballing undercuts the benefits of patents by
reducing the utility of market valuation, since markets reflect an uneven playing field created
by a century of untaxed greenhouse gas externalities.”).
35. As explained, the way innovation scholars usually think of these effects is in the
language of spillovers—or positive impacts on the decisions of future innovators. Innovation
spillovers can occur in various ways and on various time scales. For example, future
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might do so in ways that stifle future innovation. In fact, the
phenomenon of innovation snowballing, which makes certain
innovative choices more valuable, and therefore more likely, offers
a prime example. Snowballing occurs because it is easier and
cheaper to innovate in an area with a greater knowledge base; as
these individual innovation decisions accumulate, the snowball
grows in size. But as innovation proliferates in one field, the
knowledge base of other, unchosen fields remains anemic.
These research roads not taken could represent a blow to the
progression of innovation in a number of ways. First, the process
by which a particular area of research becomes the subject of
snowballing is often somewhat arbitrary. For example, in the 1980s,
VHS technology won out over Betamax technology due in large
part to snowballing effects, though neither technology was
inherently superior to the other.36 Because of this, there is no
guarantee that the snowballing field is the one that offers the most
productive innovation opportunities. Of course, the snowballing
field eventually becomes relatively more productive than other,
unchosen fields simply because the process of snowballing makes
it so. But if another field had instead, for idiosyncratic reasons (as
occurred with VHS technology), become the target of snowballing,
it might have offered even greater opportunities for productive
research and innovation. Because snowballing usually occurs
without any explicit consideration of these factors, there is often no
way to know whether a particular path-dependent innovation
trajectory was the best and most productive use of scarce
innovation-generating resources like human and financial capital.
Second, it is well known that the most groundbreaking and
productive innovation is often innovation that combines insights
from disparate fields.37 But the phenomenon of snowballing limits

innovators learn and build on information disclosed at scientific conferences and in academic
journals and learn from co-workers who have migrated from other firms, bringing their
knowledge with them. See, e.g., William Nordhaus, Designing a Friendly Space for Technological
Change to Slow Global Warming, 33 ENERGY ECON. 665, 666 (2011); Mika Maliranta, Pierre
Mohnen & Petri Rouvinen, Is Inter-Firm Labor Mobility a Channel of Knowledge Spillovers?
Evidence from a Linked Employer-Employee Panel, 18 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1161, 1161–62
(2009); Paul Almeida & Bruce Kogut, Localization of Knowledge and the Mobility of Engineers in
Regional Networks, 45 MGMT. SCI. 905, 905–07 (1999).
36. Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 3, at 406; Michael A. Cusumano, Yiorgos Mylonadis
& Richard S. Rosenbloom, Strategic Maneuvering and Mass-Market Dynamics: The Triumph of
VHS over Beta, 66 BUS. HIST. REV. 51, 51 (1992).
37. Bair & Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 10, at 1091–95 (discussing the research).
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the potential for this to occur. When the knowledge base is robust
in one area but limited in other related fields due to snowballing,
there will be fewer opportunities for researchers and innovators to
look to these other fields for insights that could be combined with
their own expertise to produce novel and innovative solutions. For
example, clean tech and dirty tech are disparate, yet sufficiently
related fields that insights from clean tech could—and often do—
benefit dirty tech researchers.38 But because snowballing has led to
a choice of disproportionate investment in dirty tech over clean
tech, the opportunities for this cross-pollination are limited. If, on
the other hand, both fields experienced more proportionate levels
of investment and growth, innovators would benefit as they drew
from the robust pool of insights made available by researchers in
the other field.
Finally, the phenomenon of snowballing increases the
likelihood of wasteful and duplicative research. If innovation is
largely concentrated in particular fields while other promising
areas go unexplored, the likelihood of duplication of effort
increases accordingly. This concern should be a familiar one to
those acquainted with the prospect theory of patents. According to
prospect theory, an innovator should be granted a broad patent
early in the lifetime of the innovation.39 Doing so, theoretically,
should help prevent so-called “patent races,” which impose a
negative congestion externality on innovation.40 The externality
arises because a patent diverts researchers into a particular area of
study as they race to get the patent prize.41 This area becomes
congested with researchers, and because only a single entity or
group can hold a patent on a particular innovation, the success rate
of the average researcher goes down as other researchers abandon
their efforts once someone succeeds and a patent is granted.42 The
broad and early patents prescribed by prospect theory arguably

38. Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 3, at 433 (“Evidence suggests that research into
some types of clean energy benefits dirtytech as much as cleantech . . . .”).
39. Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & ECON. 265,
265–90 (1977).
40. Udayan Roy, Economic Growth with Negative Externalities in Innovation, 19 J.
MACROECONOMICS 155, 156–57 (1997).
41. Id.
42. Id.
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avoid this waste and duplication in research.43 If a single party has
a limited monopoly over a particular field, this should ideally
(according to the theory) discourage other parties from engaging in
duplicative research as they race for a later-granted patent,44 while
at the same time encouraging the party with the patent to efficiently
explore and exploit the full extent of the field.45
The phenomenon of innovation snowballing raises a concern
similar to the one prospect theory seeks to address. Like the
valuable prospect of obtaining a patent, innovation snowballing
diverts researchers into particular areas of study, leading to
potential congestion externalities as large numbers of innovators
pursue the same or similar lines of research.46
Of course, those familiar with prospect theory also know that
its premise is controversial. There are many reasons to believe that
a party with a broad patent will not in fact conduct the most
efficient exploration of the patented field.47 More relevant to the
theory’s application here, however, is the idea that patent races,
wherein multiple parties engage in overlapping research, might not
be as wasteful as one might expect. Specifically, because innovation
is a stochastic process, it is possible (and in fact likely) that even
researchers working in similar fields and on similar projects will
adopt different approaches that will lead to unique contributions,48
thereby reducing the congestion concern.49 At first glance, this
criticism of prospect theory, if accepted, might seem to allay any
43. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
266–71 (1977); Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About the Benefits
and Costs of Patents, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES 1031, 1042 (1998).
44. Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV.
305, 307–08 (1992) (discussing how the patent system is set up to grant protection broad
enough to serve the system’s purposes, but not so broad as to encourage wasteful patent
races); see also Kitch, supra note 43, at 269–71.
45. Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 738–39 (2012).
46. In the absence of an explicit race to obtain a patent, the congestion concern is
perhaps not quite as salient as it is in the patent-racing context. In a patent race, the
assumption is that all those who fail to obtain the patent will abandon their research once a
patent application is filed (leading to waste). In the absence of such a race, there may be less
of a basis for such an assumption. But the reality is that even outside the patent-theory
context, innovators are often competing to get a patent and so may abandon their efforts
once a patent is achieved. There are other additional “goalposts” that, though not strictly
exclusionary in the same sense as a patent, might similarly cause competing researchers to
abandon their efforts—a product to market, for example.
47. Lemley, supra note 45, at 740–41.
48. Id. at 753–54.
49. Roy, supra note 40, at 157.
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concern of congestion externalities posed by innovation
snowballing. However, even if one grants that all those exploring
similar research questions will make some individual contributions
to the collective endeavor of innovation, it is still inevitable, given
the concentration of researchers pursuing the same topics, that
there will be some congestion and duplication of effort, which
imposes a negative externality on innovation.
Additional path dependencies related to, but distinct from,
innovation snowballing could pose similar concerns for future
innovation. For example, in addition to making certain innovation
paths more valuable (as snowballing does), past innovation also
dictates to some extent what tools are available for particular
research endeavors going forward. When research becomes
concentrated in particular fields, research tools will be developed
with these areas of interest and high activity in mind. Even if
researchers are interested in pursuing questions outside of these
areas, they may lack the capacity to do so because the tools and
infrastructure necessary to explore these questions are simply
unavailable. This can lead to an iteration of the so-called “streetlight
effect”50 in innovation, where researchers engage in whatever
inquiries they can with the tools they have available—even if those
inquiries may not be the most productive, 51 or might even, in some
cases, produce misleading results.52
Finally, network effects may sometimes give rise to innovationinhibiting path dependencies. Network effects occur when the
value of an innovation arises as more people adopt it. For instance,
the telephone (or, to give a more contemporary example, Facebook)

50. See, e.g., Cullen S. Hendrix, The Streetlight Effect in Climate Change Research on Africa,
43 GLOB. ENV’T CHANGE 137, 137 (2017) (“The streetlight effect is the tendency for researchers
to focus on particular questions, cases and variables for reasons of convenience or data
availability rather than broader relevance, policy import, or construct validity . . . .”). The
streetlight effect gets its name from the story, oft told in scientific circles, of the drunk man
looking for his wallet under a streetlight. When a police officer offers to help him, the drunk
man tells him that he thinks he lost his wallet across the street. In response to the officer’s
inquiry as to why the man is searching so far from the probable location of the wallet, the
man explains that the light is better under the streetlight. David H. Freedman, Why Scientific
Studies Are so Often Wrong: The Streetlight Effect, DISCOVER (Dec. 9, 2010).
51. See, e.g., Hendrix, supra note 50, at 137–38 (describing how a history of colonialism
and political instability led to path dependencies and the streetlight effect in climate change
science, with the ultimate result that researchers have largely neglected studying climate
change in Africa, despite Africa being significantly affected by climate change in terms of
population size and territorial size).
52. Freedman, supra note 50.
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became more valuable to each user as more people adopted it.
However, network effects could lead to path dependencies that
inhibit innovation.53 For example, people may be reluctant to adopt
a superior social networking site because the network effects of
using Facebook have made it so valuable.54 For similar reasons,
innovators may be reluctant to even attempt to improve upon
Facebook or other innovations where significant network effects
are in play, slowing down the pace of innovation.55
All of these potentially negative effects of path dependencies on
innovation can be characterized as negative externalities. Present
innovators impose costs on contemporary and future innovators as
they direct future innovation along less productive paths;
concentrate innovation in particular fields, which leads to
congestion and prevents opportunities for beneficial crosspollination; develop tools in particular areas (and fail to develop
them in others), which results in streetlight effects that limit future
research opportunities; and accumulate network effects that
constrict future innovation.
B. Anti-Innovation Norms
Innovation may also impose negative externalities on other
innovators through the workings of so-called “anti-innovation”
norms. Laura Pedraza-Fariña and I have explored how the social
norms that inevitably take hold in innovative communities (and the
psychological biases that give rise to them) can cause researchers to
pursue research agendas that are sub-optimal from the perspective
of the collective project of advancing socially beneficial
innovation.56 In fact, these norms may often mount substantial
barriers to creative and innovative activities.57
For example, extensive research in both the sociology and
psychology literatures suggests that disciplinary boundary
crossing is a crucial component in the process of generating novel,

53. Willow A. Sheremata, Barriers to Innovation: A Monopoly, Network Externalities, and
the Speed of Innovation, ANTITRUST BULL. 937, 955 (1997) (describing how network effects can
lead to a “socially excessive reluctance to switch to a superior new standard[,]” with the
result that “[v]ariety is reduced” and “[i]nnovation is excessively slow.”).
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. Bair & Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 10.
57. Id.
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creative, and groundbreaking products and ideas.58 Yet various
social norms, common in innovative communities, often prevent
researchers from engaging in this cross-pollination process.
Research priority norms, for instance, in which a community
collectively decides on the questions it will pursue, can lead to an
intense focus on particular questions, to the exclusion of other
important pursuits.59 In this exclusionary process, it is most often
the questions that fall at the intersection of disparate fields that get
overlooked60—and yet, these are the very questions that hold the
most promise for the advancement of innovation.61
Similarly, methodology norms, in which an innovation
community adopts particular tools and approaches for solving
problems while excluding others, can also mount barriers to
innovation.62 There are at least three ways in which they do so.
First, methodology norms can cause a community to overlook
particular approaches and tools that might in fact be optimal for
solving the problems with which the community is concerned.63
This dynamic can also feed back into research priority norms,
causing a streetlight effect64 where members of a community select
research questions based on which of these questions are amenable
to accepted methodologies rather than on more relevant factors,
such as which questions are the most pressing or hold the most
promise for innovation and advance.65 Second, as with research
priority norms, methodology norms also often lead to a
deprioritizing of promising intersectional questions that require a

58. See, e.g., DAVID STARK, THE SENSE OF DISSONANCE: ACCOUNTS OF WORTH IN
ECONOMIC LIFE (2009); Mathijs de Vaan, David Stark & Balázs Vedres, Game Changer: The
Topology of Creativity, 120 AM. J. SOCIO. 1144 (2015); Balázs Vedres & David Stark, Structural
Folds: Generative Disruption in Overlapping Groups, 115 AM. J. SOCIO. 1150 (2010); RICHARD K.
LESTER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INNOVATION—THE MISSING DIMENSION (2004); Gregory N.
Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and the Psychology of
Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999 (2011); Bair & Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 10, at
1091–95 (summarizing some of the research).
59. Bair & Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 10, at 1096–99.
60. Id.
61. See cases cited supra note 58.
62. Bair & Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 10, at 1099–102.
63. See id. at 1099–100.
64. See supra Section II.A (discussing the streetlight effect).
65. See Bair & Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 10, at 1101 (“It is not necessarily the most
important organizational problems that are being solved. Rather, which problems are
prioritized and how they are solved depends on actors’ methodological ability to solve them
and their power to impose their solution.”).
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combination of methodologies.66 Finally, methodology norms can
lead to duplication of effort and missed opportunities for
innovation-enhancing collaboration, due to the community-specific
jargon that inevitably arises around a community’s chosen
methodologies and approaches. Because innovative communities
tend to describe their methodologies in idiosyncratic and opaqueto-outsider ways, members of disparate groups may not realize that
they are working on similar or even identical problems.67 This
oversight can lead to wasteful duplication and missed
opportunities as distinct communities spend significant time
pursuing parallel research paths, unaware of the insights and
efforts of other innovators.
Finally, evaluation norms, whereby an innovation community
decides what work is valuable, can also pose unintended barriers
to innovation. For example, an innovation community might
adopt evaluation norms deeming work “good” if it is published
in a particular journal, is patented, receives grant funding, leads
to increased market share of a company, or meets certain
productivity standards.68 These norms can impede truly innovative
work in a number of ways. For one thing, researchers will feel
pressure to choose research questions based on their ability to
produce work that is judged as “good” in conformance with these
norms—because it makes money for the company, meets patent
eligibility standards, or appeals to peer reviewers—rather than
their potential for true creative advance. And again, as with other
anti-innovation norms, there might be a deprioritizing of
intersectional research. Gatekeepers who subscribe to a particular
community’s research and methodology norms will be less accepting
of transdisciplinary research, making it more difficult for these types
of projects to be published or receive funding—that is, to meet the
community’s evaluation norms—and thereby discouraging or
outright preventing researchers from pursuing them.69
To be clear, norms in innovation communities, including
research priority, methodology, and evaluation norms, can and do
66. Id. at 1100–01.
67. Id. at 1101–02 (describing how a fifty-year-old mathematics problem was finally
solved when mathematicians and computer scientists realized that the problem, which each
community had been working on separately and referring to with unique framing and
language, was in fact the same problem and joined forces).
68. Id. at 1102.
69. See id. at 1102–03.

1401

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:5 (2022)

serve important functions in the innovative process. Research
priority norms, for example, help community members focus and
coordinate their priorities, potentially leading to more
collaboration within a community, speedier solutions to chosen
problems, and deeper insights into those particular research
areas.70 Methodology norms go hand in hand with research priority
norms and also serve important coordinating and focusing
functions.71 Evaluation norms are beneficial for establishing and
reinforcing best practices, and, in a world with increasing volumes
of research, can also reduce search costs for community members
by providing a heuristic for quickly identifying “good” work. 72 It
is not the presence of these norms per se, then, that is problematic
from an innovation perspective, but the entrenchment and overenforcement of these norms, which can impede crucial flexibility
and creativity in the collective innovative project.73
A striking illustration of the potential anti-innovation effects of
community norms is provided by a recent study investigating
research practices in the life sciences.74 The study’s authors
discovered that when an established and prominent leader in the
field died, his or her death was followed by a surge in published
work from “outsiders”—researchers who were not in the deceased
leader’s network of collaborators.75 This outside research was
“disproportionately likely to be highly cited,”76 a measure of its
impact and importance in advancing the field. Rather than any
evidence that the deceased researcher exerted an overt influence on
the field by restricting grant funding or publication, the authors
found instead that the suppression of outside ideas was more likely
the consequence of social norms that made community members
reluctant to challenge the prevalent way of thinking (as embodied
by the deceased).77 The researcher’s death acted as a jolt of sorts,
providing a window of opportunity for new entrants; a rethinking
of current research priority, methodology, and evaluation norms;

70. Id. at 1095.
71. Id. at 1100.
72. Id. at 1102.
73. See id. at 1104.
74. Pierre Azoulay, Christian Fons-Rosen & Joshua S. Graff Zivin, Does Science Advance
One Funeral at a Time?, 109 AM. ECON. REV. 2889 (2019).
75. Id. at 2890.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 2890–91.
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and an introduction of outside ideas into the mix. Indeed,
consistent with the theory that anti-innovation norms tend to
deprioritize intersectional research, the authors found that the
“boost” to a field following a superstar researcher’s death came
largely from outsiders who “appear[ed] to tackle the mainstream
questions within the field but by leveraging newer ideas that
[arose] in other domains.”78 And consistent with the idea that
intersectional research tends to be disproportionately important for
advancing innovation, the authors also found that this research that
leveraged ideas from other areas “represent[ed] substantial
contributions” to the field.79
Though our previous exploration of innovation norms was not
framed in the language of externalities, the anti-innovation
consequences of the over-enforcement of some of these norms
could be characterized as negative externalities. Researchers who
make research and innovation decisions in accordance with antiinnovation norms impose negative externalities on other
innovators by making it more difficult for them, in turn, to pursue
research agendas more likely to lead to innovative and
groundbreaking research. For example, research priority norms, as
enforced by insiders—including prominent researchers and their
network of collaborators80—make it more difficult for other
innovators to enter a field where they could make a substantial
contribution, or to introduce new, cross-disciplinary ideas into the
study of accepted questions.81 Similarly, enforced methodology
norms make it more difficult for other innovators to adopt or even
have access to the methodologies that might lead to the greatest
innovative advances.82 And evaluation norms can serve a
gatekeeping function wherein only certain types of accepted

78. Id. at 2915, 2917; see also Jay Fitzgerald, Does Science Advance One Funeral at a Time?,
NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RSCH. (Mar. 2016), https://www.nber.org/digest/mar16/doesscience-advance-one-funeral-time (reporting on the study and quoting the study’s authors).
79. Azoulay et al., supra note 74, at 2917 (“[A]t least as measured by long-run
citation impact.”).
80. See id. at 2890–91 (describing how entry by outsiders to a field is “more anemic
when key collaborators of [a deceased star researcher] are in positions that allow them to
limit access to funding or publication outlets to those outside the club that once nucleated
around the star”).
81. Bair & Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 10, at 1096–99.
82. Id. at 1099–1102.
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research—not necessarily the most productive or innovative—are
published or receive funding.83
Anti-innovation norms are related to, but distinct from, path
dependencies. Innovation norms can certainly create path
dependencies: as innovative communities adhere to particular
research priority and methodology norms, particular areas of focus
will become more valuable due to innovation snowballing, and
particular methodologies and research tools will become more
available and accessible than others.84 But though anti-innovation
norms may contribute to path dependencies, the mechanism by
which these norms create negative externalities for innovators is
distinct. In the case of anti-innovation norms, innovation creates
negative externalities for other innovators because the social
structures that arise around innovation exert overt or more subtle
social pressures (rooted in psychological biases) on members of
innovative communities, driving them to make innovation
decisions that are often sub-optimal from an innovation
perspective. These pressures, and the psychological drives that give
rise to the need to comply with them, exist independent of any path
dependencies that might emerge as innovation proceeds along
particular trajectories.
C. Cognitive Effects
A third way in which innovation may impose negative
externalities on other innovators is through cognitive effects.
Specifically, certain innovations may impact the cognition of those
who adopt them in ways that interfere with these users’ potential
to be creative and, ultimately, produce more innovation. Several
strains of the psychology and neuroscience literatures are
beginning to explore how engagement with particular innovations
may be changing innovators’ brains and the way they think.
1. Media Innovations, Multitasking, and Cognitive Performance
One particularly well-studied phenomenon on this topic has to
do with the way media innovations have encouraged
“multitasking” behavior—defined as engaging with simultaneous

83. Id. at 1102–03.
84. See supra Section II.A.

1404

1405

Innovation’s Hidden Externalities

media streams.85 Given the technological advances that make it not
only possible but exceedingly easy to consume several forms of
media—including print media, television, digital video, music,
nonmusical audio like podcasts, video games, phone, instant
messaging, text messaging, email, digital print, and other computer
applications86—simultaneously or near simultaneously, it’s
unsurprising that the incidence of multitasking in daily life has
increased markedly.87
One might be inclined to assume that the increased ease of
multitasking, facilitated by various technological innovations, has
made people more productive. But the developing research tells a
different story. A review of the literature by Melina Uncapher and
Anthony Wagner concludes that heavy multitaskers score poorly
on a range of cognitive skills.88 For example, of all the studies that
have pitted high multitaskers against low multitaskers on working
memory tasks, approximately half showed that low multitaskers
outperformed high multitaskers, and none showed high
multitaskers outperforming low multitaskers. 89 High multitaskers
also seem to have problems with long-term memory not seen in low
multitasking groups.90
85. Melina R. Uncapher & Anthony D. Wagner, Minds and Brains of Media Multitaskers:
Current Findings and Future Directions, 115 PNAS 9889, 9889 (2018).
86. Id.
87. Id. (“[M]edia multitasking behavior is increasing in prevalence, almost doubling
from 1999 to 2009 (from 16% to 29% of total media time).”).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 9890. The remaining studies failed to show any statistically significant effects.
90. Melina D. Uncapher, Monica K. Thieu & Anthony D. Wagner, Media Multitasking
and Memory: Differences in Working Memory and Long-Term Memory, 23 PSYCHONOMIC BULL.
& REV. 483, 483 (2016); Kathleen S. Edwards & Myoungju Shin, Media Multitasking and Implicit
Learning, 79 ATTENTION PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 1535, 1535 (2017) (finding deficits in
implicit learning (a form of long-term memory) among high multitaskers). One possible
explanation for the working memory findings is that heavy multitasking over time may
affect attentional processes, making it more difficult for high multitaskers to exert attentional
control and increasing the incidence of attentional lapses. Uncapher & Wagner, supra note
85, at 9891. In support of this attentional hypothesis, additional studies have found that high
multitaskers are less able than low multitaskers to effectively perform a task when
confronted with distractions. See, e.g., Eyal Ophir, Clifford Nass & Anthony D. Wagner,
Cognitive Control in Media Multitaskers, 106 PNAS 15583, 15583 (2009); Pedro Cardoso-Leite,
Rachel Kludt, Gianluca Vignola, Wei Ji Ma, C. Shawn Green & Daphne Bavelier, Technology
Consumption and Cognitive Control: Contrasting Action Video Game Experience with Media
Multitasking, 78 ATTENTION PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 218, 218 (2016); Wisnu Wiradhany
& Mark R. Nieuwenstein, Cognitive Control in Media Multitaskers: Two Replication Studies and
a Meta-Analysis, 79 ATTENTION PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 2620, 2620 (2017). Although it
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In addition to attentional and working memory deficits, a habit
of media multitasking may also impact ability to problem solve.
Three experiments that pitted high multitaskers against low
multitaskers on a standard task91 used to evaluate abstract
reasoning and fluid intelligence (measures of problem-solving
ability)92 all found that low multitaskers performed significantly
better than their high multitasking counterparts.93
is unclear whether these effects arise from an inability to prioritize attention by filtering
unwanted information or a more general inability to sustain attention for long periods of
time, what is clear is that high multitaskers seem to have increased trouble with attention as
compared to those who do not multitask as often. Uncapher & Wagner, supra note 85, at 9892.
The few studies that have directly addressed the link between multitasking and attention
also support this conclusion. See id. (discussing Brandon C.W. Ralph, David R. Thomson,
Paul Seli, Jonathan S.A. Carriere & Daniel Smilek, Media Multitasking and Behavioral Measures
of Sustained Attention, 77 ATTENTION PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 390 (2015), and Jit Yong
Yap & Stephen Wee Hun Lim, Media Multitasking Predicts Unitary Versus Splitting Visual Focal
Attention, 25 J. COGNITIVE PSYCH. 889 (2013), and concluding that the studies “report negative
effects of media multitasking on measures of attention.”).
91. The task, known as the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices, “is a 60-item test
for measuring abstract reasoning [and is] considered a nonverbal estimate of fluid
intelligence[.]” Warren B. Bilker, John A. Hansen, Colleen M. Brensinger, Jan Richard, Raquel
E. Gur & Ruben C. Gur, Development of Abbreviated Nine-Item Forms of the Raven’s Standard
Progressive Matrices Test, 19 ASSESSMENT 354, 354 (2012).
92. See, e.g., David Huepe & Natalia Salas, Fluid Intelligence, Social Cognition, and
Perspective Changing Abilities as Pointers of Psychosocial Adaptation, FRONTIERS HUM.
NEUROSCIENCE, June 2013, at 1, 1 (defining fluid intelligence as “the ability to think logically
and to solve problems in new situations, regardless of the acquisition of knowledge”).
93. Meredith Minear, Faith Brasher, Mark McCurdy, Jack Lewis & Andrea
Younggren, Working Memory, Fluid Intelligence, and Impulsiveness in Heavy Media Multitaskers,
20 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 1274, 1276, 1277 (2013) (discussing studies 1 and 2); Uncapher
& Wagner, supra note 85, at 9893 (discussing Reem Alzahabi, Mark W. Becker & David Z.
Hambrick, Investigating the Relationship Between Media Multitasking and Processes Involved in
Task-Switching, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 1872 (2017)).
The cognitive effects discussed here suggest that there may also be differences in brain
structure or function between those who multitask heavily and those who do not. Two
studies that addressed this question found that the brains of heavy multitaskers do indeed
look and act different. One of these studies found a negative correlation between
multitasking behaviors and grey matter (brain cell) volume in an area of the brain
responsible for cognitive control. Kep Kee Loh & Ryota Kanai, Higher Media Multi-Tasking
Activity is Associated with Smaller Gray-Matter Density in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex, PLOS
ONE, Sept. 2014, at 1, 1. It also found a negative correlation between multitasking behaviors
and connectivity between control areas. Id. The second study found that when high
multitasking adolescents were distracted during a reading comprehension task, brain areas
required for exerting attentional control were more active compared to those of low
multitaskers performing the same task under the same conditions. Mona Moisala, V.
Salmela, L. Hietajärvi, E. Salo, S. Carlson, O. Salonen, K. Lonka, K. Hakkarainen, K. SalmelaAro & K. Alho, Media Multitasking Is Associated with Distractibility and Increased Prefrontal
Activity in Adolescents and Young Adults, 134 NEUROIMAGE 113, 113 (2016). Based on this
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These findings are primarily correlational and so do not prove
that heavy multitasking negatively impacts cognition and brain
function. It could be the case, for example, that those with a
preexisting, lower ability to pay attention naturally gravitate
towards opportunities to multitask.94 But the studies are at least
consistent with the hypothesis that heavy multitasking behavior
does in fact change the brain in ways that affect cognition.95 And if
so, it does so in ways relevant to creativity and innovation.
Innovation entails the creation or application of something new,96
often in an entrepreneurial setting to meet consumer needs.97 But
the cognitive skills one would expect to aid in the process of

finding, the study’s authors hypothesized that heavy multitaskers needed to exert more
cognitive effort than light multitaskers in order to pay the required attention and effectively
complete the task. Id.
94. Uncapher & Wagner, supra note 85, at 9894–95.
95. See, e.g., id. at 9889 (“Even for fully developed brains it is possible that frequent
engagement with simultaneous media streams affects cognition, behavior, and neural
architecture.”); Moisala et al., supra note 93, at 120 (“One interpretation of our results is that
extensive daily media multitasking directly reinforces task switching behavior and
deteriorates the ability to sustain attention on a focal task. Frequent multitasking behaviors
enabled by modern technology may, in other words, lead to reduced executive control and
greater susceptibility to interference.”); Ophir et al., supra note 90, at 15583 (hypothesizing
that “chronic media multitasking” may be “the cause” of “deficits in cognitive control”); Loh
& Kanai, supra note 93, at 6 (“Although it is conceivable that individuals with smaller [grey
matter volume in control areas] are more susceptible to multitasking due to weaker ability
in cognitive control or socio-emotional regulation, it is equally plausible that higher levels of
exposure to multitasking situations lead to structural changes in [these brain areas].”)
96. See, e.g., PETER DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 36 (2015)
(“Innovation . . . creates a resource.”); Innovation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/innovation (last visited Feb. 13, 2022) (“the introduction of something
new”; “a new idea, method, or device”).
97. DRUCKER, supra note 96, at 36.

1407

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:5 (2022)

innovation—including abstract reasoning,98 fluid intelligence,99
and exerting attentional control while completing a creative
task100—are all skills associated with lower, rather than higher,
levels of simultaneous engagement with media streams made
possible by modern innovations like cell phones, instant
messaging, audio and video streaming, etc. These innovations may
therefore be imposing negative externalities on other innovators by
interfering with their ability to effectively engage in the mental
processes necessary for producing high levels of quality innovation.
2. Smartphones, Cognitive Performance, and Impulse Control
Even in the absence of conscious engagement in multitasking
behavior, certain innovations may provide unwanted distractions
98. See, e.g., Adrian Furnham, John Crump & Viren Swami, Abstract Reasoning and Big
Five Personality Correlates of Creativity in a British Occupational Sample, 28 IMAGINATION
COGNITION & PERSONALITY 361, 361 (2009) (finding a modest but significant correlation
between abstract reasoning and divergent thinking, a measure of creative potential); Adrian
Furnham & Mikael Nederstrom, Ability, Demographic and Personality Predictors of Creativity,
48 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 957, 960 (2010) (showing a modest and nonsignificant correlation between abstract reasoning and divergent thinking. The authors
explain the non-significant result on the fact that the divergent thinking measure was a
verbal test; they did find a highly significant correlation between divergent thinking and
verbal reasoning); Baoguo Shi, Lijing Wang, Jiahui Yang, Mengpin Zhang & Li Xu,
Relationship Between Divergent Thinking and Intelligence: An Empirical Study of the Threshold
Hypothesis with Chinese Children, FRONTIERS PSYCH., Feb. 2017, at 1, 6 (finding a positive
relationship between intelligence and divergent thinking in Chinese children); Emanuel
Jauk, Mathias Benedek & Aljoscha C. Neubauer, The Road to Creative Achievement: A Latent
Variable Model of Ability and Personality Predictors, 28 EUR. J. PERSONALITY 95, 95 (2014)
(finding that intelligence predicted creative achievement).
99. See, e.g., Emanuel Jauk, Mathias Benedek, Beate Dunst & Aljoscha C. Neubauer,
The Relationship Between Intelligence and Creativity: New Support for the Threshold Hypothesis by
Means of Empirical Breakpoint Detection, 41 INTEL. 212, 212 (2013) (finding evidence for the
hypothesis that an intelligence quotient (IQ) of at least 100 is necessary condition for
divergent thinking (a measure of creative potential), and that creative achievement is
positively correlated with IQ).
100. See, e.g., Darya Zabelina, Arielle Saporta & Mark Beeman, Flexible or Leaky Attention
in Creative People? Distinct Patterns of Attention for Different Types of Creative Thinking, 44
MEMORY & COGNITION 488, 488 (2016) (“Creativity, like many mental behaviors, requires
attention.”). Interestingly, this study’s authors found that different types of creativity
(real-world creative achievement versus divergent thinking, a measure of creative potential)
are associated with different types of attentional processes. Id. While subjects who were
divergent thinkers tended to be better at filtering irrelevant information, subjects with a
proven track-record of creative achievement had “leaky” attention filters that let in irrelevant
information. Id. But because creative achievement still requires attention, the authors
hypothesized that creative achievers rely more heavily on cognitive control “to maintain
their attention when needed . . . to persist with an idea or behavior that ultimately leads to a
new musical composition, or a highly original painting[.]” Id. at 497.
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that affect cognitive processes. A well-studied example of such a
technology is the ubiquitous smartphone. Cognitive scientists have
been exploring how the presence of smartphones in people’s daily
lives affects attention, memory, reward processing, and other
cognitive tasks.
What they have found tentatively suggests that smartphones
have at least short-term detrimental effects on attention.101 A
common feature of smartphones is their “notification”
functionality, which alerts users to updates and messages in
applications other than the one they’re currently using. If a phone
user takes the time to deal with the unintended notification, the
attentional shift required to do so can delay their work on the
original application by up to four times.102 But even when a phone
user tries to ignore notifications, they can still interfere with
attention. In one study, merely becoming aware of a notification (by
hearing the ding or feeling the vibration of the phone) resulted in
lower performance on an attention-based task.103 Perhaps most
surprisingly, performance on demanding attentional tasks seems to
be affected by the simple presence of a smartphone, even when no
notifications or interruptions occur.104
101. Henry H. Wilmer, Lauren E. Sherman & Jason M. Chien, Smartphones and
Cognition: A Review of Research Exploring the Links Between Mobile Technology Habits and
Cognitive Functioning, FRONTIERS COGNITIVE PSYCH., Apr. 2017, at 1, 1 (reviewing
the literature).
102. Luis A. Leiva, Matthias Böhmer, Sven Gehring & Antonio Krüger, Back to the App:
The Costs of Mobile Application Interruptions, PROC. 14TH INT’L CONF. ON HUM.-COMPUT.
INTERACTION WITH MOBILE DEVICES SERV.-MOBILE 291, 291 (2012).
103. Cary Stothart, Ainsley Mitchum & Courtney Yehnert, The Attentional Cost of
Receiving a Cell Phone Notification, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: HUM. PERCEPTION &
PERFORMANCE 893, 893 (2015).
104. Bill Thornton, Alyson Faires, Maija Robbins & Eric Rollins, The Mere Presence of a
Cell Phone May Be Distracting: Implications for Attention and Task Performance, 45 SOC. PSYCH.
479, 479 (2014). When a researcher (seemingly by accident) left either a notebook or a
smartphone on subjects’ desks, those in the smartphone condition performed significantly
worse on the demanding aspects of an attention-based task than those in the notebook
condition. Id. at 481–84.
Smartphones and similar technological innovations may also have both short- and
long-term effects on memory and learning. The basic idea is that as we become accustomed
to ready access to information, we may consciously or subconsciously exert less effort in
memorizing and learning. Wilmer et al., supra note 101, at 9. For example, individuals told
that newly-learned trivia facts they were typing into a computer would be stored for later
access were not able to recall those facts as well as subjects told that the information would
be erased. Betsy Sparrow, Jenny Liu & Daniel M. Wegner, Google Effects on Memory: Cognitive
Consequences of Having Information at Our Fingertips, 333 SCI. MAG. 776, 776–77 (2011). The
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More generally, there is also evidence that smartphone use
negatively affects cognitive ability. Studies have shown that
academic performance—usually measured by grade point
average—is negatively associated with time spent instant

authors referred to this phenomenon as the “Google Effect,” and it has also been referred to
by subsequent researchers as “digital amnesia.” Wilmer et al., supra note 101, at 7. The
authors hypothesized that the expectation of access interfered with processes that encode the
information into long-term memory. See id. (discussing the study). They also hypothesized
that our cognitive processes might be adapting in long-lasting ways to particular digital
innovations. In support of this hypothesis, they found that subjects were able to recall where
information was stored on a computer (folder names) better than they were able to recall the
information itself, suggesting that we have adapted to innovations that make it more
important to be able to find—rather than to know—particular pieces of information. Sparrow
et al., supra, at 777–78. Complementary studies involving the camera and GPS navigational
functions of smartphones have also found that when test subjects use these features, they
remember less of what they experienced at the time of use. Subjects at an art museum told
to take pictures of certain objects and merely to observe others were better able to recall, a
day later, those objects they observed without taking a photo. Linda A. Henkel, Point-andShoot Memories: The Influence of Taking Photos on Memory for a Museum Tour, 25 PSYCH. SCI.
396, 396 (2014). In a separate experiment, the authors found that when subjects were asked
to zoom in on a particular aspect of the object when taking a picture, they had better recall
of not just the zoomed-in features but the object as a whole, suggesting that it is engagement
with an object that facilitates recall, and that, in the general case, digital photography
discourages this engagement. And subjects who reached a destination with the aid of voice
navigation were worse at developing cognitive maps of the navigated environment than
those who reached their destination by first studying a paper map. Gary E. Burnett & Kate
Lee, The Effect of Vehicle Navigation Systems on the Formation of Cognitive Maps, 40 INT’L J.
PSYCH. 27, 27 (2005). There are also a number of infamous instances where individuals
“offloaded” the cognitive task of navigation to navigational devices to such an extent that
they found themselves in a variety of dangerous and inconvenient situations, including
driving into a bay, driving across three countries in the wrong direction, driving up a cliff,
driving into a sand pit, and wedging a car into a cherry tree. Lauren Hansen, 8 Drivers Who
Blindly
Followed
Their
GPS
into
Disaster,
WEEK
(Jan.
8,
2015),
https://theweek.com/articles/464674/8-drivers-who-blindly-followed-gps-into-disaster.
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messaging,105 using social networking sites,106 and engaging with
smartphones107 and electronic media108 generally.
Finally, some intriguing work has revealed a potential
relationship between smartphone use and the way people seek out
rewards. Interactions with media innovations, like the texting and
social networking applications found on smartphones, provide
emotional gratification.109 On the neural level, researchers believe
that checking one’s smartphone releases dopamine in the brain,110
105. See, e.g., Laura E. Levine, Bradley M. Waite & Laura L. Bowman, Electronic Media
Use, Reading, and Academic Distractibility in College Youth, 10 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV.
560, 564–65 (2007) (finding a negative correlation between time spent instant messaging and
academic performance); Annie Beth Fox, Jonathan Rosen & Mary Crawford, Distractions,
Distractions: Does Instant Messaging Affect College Students’ Performance on a Concurrent Reading
Comprehension Task?, 12 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 51, 51 (2009) (same).
106. See, e.g., Paul A. Kirschner & Aryn C. Karpinski, Facebook® and Academic
Performance, 26 COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV. 1237, 1237 (2010) (finding a negative correlation
between Facebook use and academic performance); Reynol Junco, Too Much Face and Not
Enough Books: The Relationship Between Multiple Indices of Facebook Use and Academic
Performance, 28 COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV. 187, 187 (2012) (same); Aryn C. Karpinski, Paul A.
Kirschner, Ipek Ozer, Jennifer A. Mellott & Pius Ochwo, An Exploration of Social Networking
Site Use, Multitasking, and Academic Performance Among United States and European University
Students, 29 COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV. 1182, 1182 (2013) (finding a negative correlation between
social networking site use and academic performance); Jomon Aliyas Paul, Hope M. Baker
& Justin Daniel Cochran, Effect of Online Social Networking on Student Academic Performance,
28 COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV. 2117, 2117 (2012) (same). Interestingly, this last study found that
time spent on social networking sites was correlated by the attention spans of the students,
supporting the link discussed in section II.C.1 between multitasking behavior and
attention span.
107. See, e.g., Louis-Philippe Beland & Richard Murphy, Ill Communication: Technology,
Distraction & Student Performance, 41 LAB. ECON. 61, 61 (2016) (finding that students
performed significantly better on exams after their school banned smartphones); Andrew
Lepp, Jacob E. Barkley & Aryn C. Karpinski, The Relationship Between Cell Phone Use, Academic
Performance, Anxiety, and Satisfaction with Life in College Students, 31 COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV.
343, 343 (2014) (finding that academic performance was negatively associated with cell
phone use).
108. See, e.g., Wade C. Jacobsen & Renata Forste, The Wired Generation: Academic and
Social Outcomes of Electronic Media Use Among University Students, 14 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY,
BEHAV., AND SOC. NETWORKING 275, 275 (2011) (finding a negative relationship between
electronic media use and academic performance); Reynol Junco & Sheila R. Cotten, No A 4
U: The Relationship Between Multitasking and Academic Performance, 59 COMPUTS. & EDUC. 505,
505 (2012) (finding that using Facebook and texting while completing schoolwork were
negatively associated with academic performance).
109. See, e.g., Zheng Wang & John M. Tchernev, The “Myth” of Media Multitasking:
Reciprocal Dynamics of Media Multitasking, Personal Needs, and Gratifications, 62 J. COMMC’N
493, 493 (2012) (finding that media multitasking provides “emotional gratifications” even
when the multitasker is not seeking these rewards and is instead seeking cognitive rewards).
110. See, e.g., Sara O’Donnell & Leonard H. Epstein, Smartphones Are More Reinforcing
than Food for Students, 90 ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 124, 132 (2019) (finding that smartphones
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a neurotransmitter important for reward processing and positive
reinforcement,111 and also implicated in addictive behaviors.112 But
constant access to the rewards smartphones provide might make
users less able to delay gratification and more likely to choose
smaller, short-term rewards over larger, longer-term goals.113 In
one experiment, heavy smartphone users were more likely than
their peers to accept a small, immediate reward instead of waiting
for a larger reward; they also tended to be more impulsive.114 Like
many of the other studies presented here, these results are
correlational and so tell us nothing about the direction of causality.
It could be the case that impulsive people are more attracted to
smartphones and so use them more heavily. But it could also be the
case that heavy smartphone use affects the way individuals process
provide more positive reinforcement than food in some cases and hypothesizing the
involvement of dopamine systems); Aviv Weinstein & Michel Lejoyeux, New Developments
on the Neurobiological and Pharmaco-Genetic Mechanisms Underlying Internet and Videogame
Addiction, 24 AM. J. ON ADDICTIONS 117, 117 (2015) (finding that video game playing results
in dopamine release); Markham Heid, We Need to Talk About Kids and Smartphones, TIME (Oct.
10, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://time.com/4974863/kids-smartphones-depression/ (“Research
has linked social media and other phone-based activities with an uptick in feel-good
neurochemicals like dopamine . . . .”).
111. See, e.g., Hsing-Chen Tsai, Feng Zhang, Antoine Adamantidis, Garret D. Stuber,
Antonello Bonci, Luis de Lecea & Karl Deisseroth, Phasic Firing in Dopaminergic Neurons Is
Sufficient for Behavioral Conditioning, 324 SCI. 1080, 1080 (2009) (describing dopamine’s role in
behavioral reward); Wolfram Schultz, Getting Formal with Dopamine and Reward, 36 NEURON
241, 241 (2002) (describing how dopamine neurons in various areas of the brain convey
reward information); Bill Davidow, Exploiting the Neuroscience of Internet Addiction, ATLANTIC
(July 18, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/07/exploiting-theneuroscience-of-internet-addiction/259820/ (describing dopamine’s role in behavioral
reward).
112. See, e.g., Marc A. Shuckit, Science, Medicine, and the Future: Substance Use Disorders,
314 BMJ 1605, 1606–07 (1997) (describing dopamine’s hypothesized role in drug and alcohol
addiction); Nora D. Volkow, Gene-Jack Wang, Joanna S. Fowler, Dardo Tomasi & Frank
Telang, Addiction: Beyond Dopamine Reward Circuitry, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15037
(2011) (reviewing the scientific literature on dopamine’s role in addiction); Davidow, supra
note 111 (stating—in a somewhat oversimplified manner—that “[t]he release of dopamine
forms the basis for nicotine, cocaine, and gambling addictions”); see also Diana I. Tamir &
Jason P. Mitchell, Disclosing Information About the Self Is Intrinsically Rewarding, 109 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8038, 8038 (2012) (finding that disclosing information about oneself on
social media is highly correlated with increased activation in known “reward” areas of the
brain); Dar Meshi, Carmen Morawetz & Hauke R. Heekeren, Nucleus Accumbens Response to
Gains in Reputation for the Self Relative to Gains for Others Predicts Social Media Use, 7 FRONTIERS
HUM. NEUROSCIENCE 439, 439 (2013) (finding that the response in brain reward areas to a
reputation-based reward was higher for subjects who used Facebook more often).
113. Wilmer et al., supra note 101, at 10.
114. Henry H. Wilmer & Jason M. Chein, Mobile Technology Habits: Patterns of Association
Among Device Usage, Intertemporal Preference, Impulse Control, and Reward Sensitivity, 23
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 1607, 1607 (2016).
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rewards, making it more difficult for them to delay gratification.115
At least one additional study that measured impulsivity before and
after controlled smartphone use supports this latter hypothesis.116
These results again suggest that particular innovations may be
imposing negative externalities on present and future innovators.
The process of innovation requires the exertion of attentional
control while completing a creative task,117 and, relatedly, it may
require a degree of impulse control as well.118 And recent research
suggests that cognitive skills like memory are also important for
creativity.119 To the extent innovation requires high levels of
creativity, smartphones and other similar innovations may be
inadvertently disrupting innovators’ potential.
3. Digital Innovations and Information Processing
Certain innovations may also be changing how users process
information in ways that relate to their innovative potential. A
growing body of research suggests that when individuals take in
information digitally rather than via print—an increasingly
115. Wilmer et al., supra note 101, at 10.
116. A.A. Hadar, D. Eliraz, A. Lazarovits, U. Alyagon & A. Zangen, Using Longitudinal
Exposure to Causally Link Smartphone Usage to Changes in Behavior, Cognition and Right
Prefrontal Neural Activity, 8 BRAIN STIMULATION 318, 318 (2015) (finding that after 3 months
of exposure to smartphones, subjects who had not used a smartphone previously tended to
be less likely than prior to the study to delay gratification; subjects who had previously not
used a smartphone and continued their non-use through the duration of the study showed
no change in their tendency to delay gratification).
117. See, e.g., Zabelina et al., supra note 100, at 488 (“Creativity, like many mental
behaviors, requires attention.”).
118. See, e.g., Fa-Chung Chiu, The Effects of Exercising Self-Control on Creativity, 14
THINKING SKILLS & CREATIVITY 20, 20 (2014) (“In summary, the data indicated that exercising
self-control could increase creativity . . . .”). But see David Schuldberg, Six Subclinical
Spectrum Traits in Normal Creativity, 13 CREATIVITY RES. J. 5, 12 (2001) (finding that creativity
scores were positively associated with measures of impulsivity). It is likely that where
creativity is concerned there is an “optimal” amount of impulsivity. While impulsivity could
boost creativity by promoting norm- and convention-breaking behaviors, id. at 11, some
degree of impulse control is likely required to actually put in the work creative achievement
requires—”to persist with an idea or behavior that ultimately leads to a new musical
composition, or a highly original painting[.]” Zabelina et al., supra note 100, at 497.
119. See, e.g., Kevin P. Madore, Donna Rose Addis & Daniel L. Schacter, Creativity and
Memory: Effects of an Episodic-Specificity Induction on Divergent Thinking, 26 PSYCH. SCI. 1461,
1461 (2015) (finding “evidence that episodic memory [memory of autobiographical events]
is involved in divergent creative thinking”); Art Markman, Creativity Is Memory, PSYCH.
TODAY
(Oct.
6,
2015),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/ulteriormotives/201510/creativity-is-memory (discussing the Madore study and his book SMART
THINKING, which argues that “[c]reativity is driven by memory[,]” because “all creative work
requires using your existing knowledge to help you to do new things”).
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common occurrence given innovations like personal computers,
tablets, smartphones, e-readers, and the like—their brains handle
the information differently. One study by Geoff Kaufman and Mary
Flanagan, for example, found that when subjects took in
information from a digital platform, they tended to focus on and
remember concrete details, but were less likely to engage in abstract
thinking and make high-level inferences about the information
compared to subjects who took in the same information in hard
copy.120 A review of the relevant literature also found that students
had better comprehension of print versus online texts, at least when
the texts were more than a page long.121 And a recent series of
studies revealed that although students subjectively preferred
digital media and read faster and judged their own comprehension
as better using this format, their overall comprehension was better
when they engaged with print media.122 These differences in
comprehension were less important when it came to gleaning the
main idea from a text, but became more striking when students
were asked more specific questions about what they had read.123
These results too could be conceptualized in the language of
externalities. Innovation is often an incremental process124
120. Geoff Kaufman & Mary Flanagan, High-Low Split: Divergent Cognitive Construal
Levels Triggered by Digital and Non-digital Platforms, PROC. 2016 CHI CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS
COMPUT. SYS. 2773, 2773 (2016).
121. Lauren M. Singer & Patricia A. Alexander, Reading on Paper and Digitally: What the
Past Decades of Empirical Research Reveal, 87 REV. EDUC. RSCH. 1007, 1016 (2017) (discussing
the “reported associations between length and medium for texts longer than one page”).
122. Lauren M. Singer & Patricia A. Alexander, Reading Across Mediums: Effects of
Reading Digital and Print Texts on Comprehension and Calibration, 85 J. EXPERIMENTAL EDUC.
155, 166–67 (2017).
123. Id. The way users engage with texts might also vary based on the format. A recent
study published in Pediatrics, for example, found that when parents read to their toddlers on
a tablet, parent and child engaged in less of the back-and-forth dialogue necessary for
language acquisition than when they read from a print book. Tiffany G. Munzer, Alison L.
Miller, Heidi M. Weeks, Niko Kaciroti & Jenny Radesky, Differences in Parent-Toddler
Interactions with Electronic Versus Print Books, 143 PEDIATRICS 1, 1 (2019); see also Perri Klass,
Reading to Your Toddler? Print Books Are Better Than Digital Ones, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2019)
(discussing the study). This was true whether or not the digital version of the book included
so-called “enhancements”—for example, the option to tap a word and activate narration or
sound effects. Munzer, supra at 3, 6.
124. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A
Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2330
(1994) (“Innovation in software development is typically incremental.”); Clark D. Asay,
Enabling Patentless Innovation, 74 MD. L. REV. 431, 436 (2015) (describing the “cumulative,
incremental nature of open innovation”); Robin A. Moore, Note: Fair Use and Innovation
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requiring innovators to understand and build on what has come
before.125 The extent to which an innovator will be successful in
building on a preexisting idea will depend in part on how well she
understands the original idea and in part on her ability to think
about the idea in novel and creative ways. If, due to particular
technological innovations, the way innovators learn about, process,
and think about preexisting ideas changes, this may also change the
way in which they go about building on those preexisting ideas.
And the change may not be entirely positive. Reduced
understanding of and ability to think abstractly about existing ideas
may very well result in a lower quality and quantity of sequential
innovation. One cognitive scientist, commenting on the results of
the Kaufman study, put it this way: when innovators get the bulk
of their information from digital platforms, “[t]he opportunity for
deeper thinking, for deliberation, or for abstract thinking is much
more limited. [Innovators] have to rely more on surface-level
information, and that is not a good recipe for creativity or invention.”126
4. Digital Innovations and Affective Processes
Finally, particular innovations may interfere with emotional
processing. As anyone familiar with the process of innovation
knows, creativity is not merely a cognitive process. It is also an
affective process,127 requiring emotional involvement and
adeptness. If one considers any great work of fiction, for example,
one of the things that makes it great is the author’s ability to
Policy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 944, 948 (2007) (“In the patent context, incremental innovation
occurs frequently . . . .”).
125. See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco, Stefan Bechtold & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The
Nature of Sequential Innovation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 15 (2017) (“[P}eople do not just
‘have’ ideas. Ideas develop out of preexisting ideas, and those preexisting ideas . . . shape the
choices of later stage innovators.”).
126. Saga Briggs, 6 Ways Digital Media Impacts the Brain, INFORMED (Sept. 12, 2016),
https://www.opencolleges.edu.au/informed/features/5-ways-digital-media-impactsbrain/ (quoting Jordan Grafman, chief of cognitive neuroscience at the National Institute of
Neurological Disorders and Stroke).
127. See, e.g., Scott Barry Kaufman, The Emotions That Make Us More Creative, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Aug, 12, 2015) (discussing how cognitive and affective processes work together to
motivate creative behaviors); Michael W. Ceci & V. K. Kumar, A Correlational Study of
Creativity, Happiness, Motivation, and Stress from Creative Pursuits, 17 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 609,
620–21 (finding that subjects with a higher “capacity to feel extreme or intense emotions”
scored higher on measures of creativity); Scott Barry Kaufman, Opening Up Openness to
Experience: A Four-Factor Model and Relations to Creative Achievement in the Arts and Sciences,
47 J. CREATIVE BEHAV. 233, 250 (2013) (finding that “affective engagement” or openness to
the full range of human emotions, predicted creative achievement in the arts).
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understand and communicate the emotional worlds of her
characters.128 More concretely, empathic accuracy, defined as the
ability to accurately estimate the emotions of others, has been
empirically linked to objective third-party measures of creative output.129
But if empathic accuracy is a skill that contributes to creativity,
then creativity may also be threatened by processes that interfere
with the acquisition or maintenance of empathic functioning. And
it appears that engagement with certain types of innovations—in
particular, heavy use of digital media facilitated by innovations like
social media applications and the devices that support them—does
in fact undermine empathic ability. A 2014 study out of UCLA’s
psychology department found, for example, that sixth-graders who
attended a five-day camp where electronic devices were prohibited
were better able to identify emotions in a lab setting than their
classmates who went about their normal summer routines, which
typically involved an average of four-and-a-half hours of daily
screen time.130 The researchers also found, through pre- and posttesting, that the students who attended camp significantly
improved in their ability to identify others’ emotions in the five

128. See, e.g., William H. Coles, Emotional Complexity in Literary Fiction, STORY IN
LITERARY FICTION, https://www.storyinliteraryfiction.com/essays-on-writing/emotionalcomplexity-in-literary-fiction/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2022) (“Without exception, in good
literary fiction, emotional complexity must be earned, it must be credible to the reader, it
must be logical for the character’s complexities and for the story plot, too, and there must be
elements of surprise without being unfaithful to the character’s established mores,
sensitivities, and beliefs.”). This feature is so characteristic of good literary fiction, in fact,
that those who regularly read it are better at inferring other people’s feelings and are more
empathetic, presumably because “the sociocognitive complexity . . . in literary fiction
prompts readers to make, adjust, and consider multiple interpretations of characters’ mental
states.” Alison Flood, Literary Fiction Readers Understand Others’ Emotions Better, Study Finds,
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2016). In other words, it gives readers practice in familiarizing
themselves with others’ emotions and mental states, and the actions and behaviors that
might arise from them.
129. Glenn Geher, Kian Betancourt & Olivia Jewell, The Link Between Emotional
Intelligence and Creativity, 37 IMAGINATION, COGNITION, & PERSONALITY 5, 5 (2017); see also
Glenn Geher, Creativity Goes with Emotional Intelligence, PSYCH. TODAY (June 29, 2017),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/darwins-subterranean-world/201706/
creativity-goes-emotional-intelligence (discussing the study).
130. Yalda T. Uhls, Minas Michikyan, Jordan Morris, Debra Garcia, Gary W. Small,
Eleni Zgoruoru & Patricia M. Greenfield, Five Days at Outdoor Education Camp Without Screens
Improves Preteen Skills with Nonverbal Emotion Cues, 39 COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV. 387, 387 (2014);
see also Stuart Wolpert, In Our Digital World, Are Young People Losing the Ability to Read
Emotions?, UCLA NEWSROOM (Aug. 21, 2014), https://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/inour-digital-world-are-young-people-losing-the-ability-to-read-emotions (discussing the
study’s findings).
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days they were away from their screens.131 They hypothesize that
real-world social interaction contributes to the development of
emotional intelligence, and that “the extensive use of digital media,
often text-based and thus inherently lacking nonverbal emotional
cues, may thus curtail the face-to-face experiences necessary to
master important social skills,” even though digital media is often
used for social communication.132
Because of the link between empathic functioning and creative
potential, these results have relevance for innovation externalities.
The overuse of certain innovations may inhibit innovators’
collective long-term ability to be creative and continue to produce
high levels of quality innovation.
5. Conclusions
Pulling together these various strands of the psychology and
neuroscience literatures leads to an intriguing hypothesis: certain
innovations may be exerting an influence on innovators’ brains and
the way they think. The resultant negative impact on cognitive
131. Uhls et al., supra note 130.
132. Id. at 388. A longitudinal study currently in press supports this hypothesis. The
study followed 960 Norwegian four-year-olds for four years to examine potential links
between screen time and emotional understanding. Vera Skalicka, Beate Wold Hygen, Frode
Stenseng, Silja Berg Karstad & Lars Wichstrom, Screen Time and the Development of Emotion
Understanding from Age 4 to Age 8: A Community Study, 37 BRITISH J. DEV. PSYCH. 427 (2019).
The study’s authors found that children with more screen time at age four scored lower on
measures of emotional understanding at age six. Id. They also found that children with a
television in their bedroom at age six scored lower on measures of emotional understanding
at age eight. Id.
Yet it would be premature to conclude that digital media use impairs emotional
functioning in all situations. A review of the existing literature suggests that the effects of
digital technologies on indicators of affective skill are contextual and depend in part on the
way these technologies are used. Adam Waytz & Kurt Gray, Does Online Technology Make Us
More or Less Sociable? A Preliminary Review and Call for Research, 13 PERSPS. PSYCH. SCI. 473
(2018). The review concluded, for example, that when digital technologies are used to
enhance and deepen existing real-world relationships, or when they provide a social outlet
for those without access to real-world relationships, their use can have a positive effect on
emotional functioning. Id. at 480–81. However, consistent with the UCLA and other studies,
when digital innovations are used to replace real-world interactions, the impact on emotional
functioning is negative. Id. Subjects who depend more on their smartphones have lower
emotional intelligence, Marta Beranuy, Ursula Oberst, Xavier Carbonell & Ander Chamarro,
Problematic Internet and Mobile Phone Use and Clinical Symptoms in College Students: The Role of
Emotional Intelligence, 25 COMPS. HUM. BEHAV. 1182, 1182 (2009), for example, and surveys
have revealed a negative association between internet use and self-reports of empathy.
Martin Melchers, Mei Li, Yafei Chen, Wanqi Zhang & Christian Montag, Low Empathy Is
Associated with Problematic Use of the Internet: Empirical Evidence from China and Germany, 17
ASIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 56, 56 (2015).
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tasks associated with and required for creative thinking could
potentially lead to long-term, adverse effects on creativity.
There is some additional indirect evidence for this hypothesis.
A much-publicized 2011 meta-analysis of decades of creativity
measurements by Kyung Hee Kim concluded that creativity scores
have been steadily declining since 1990, even while traditional
measures of intelligence like IQ and SAT scores have been going
up.133 Kim’s striking conclusion is that
over the last 20 years, children have become less emotionally
expressive, less energetic, less talkative and verbally expressive,
less humorous, less imaginative, less unconventional, less lively
and passionate, less perceptive, less apt to connect seemingly
irrelevant things, less synthesizing, and less likely to see things
from a different angle.134

Kim speculates that some of these effects may be due to the
concurrent rise in certain innovations, particularly digital
innovations, “some aspects of [which] may hinder the development
of a child’s creative personality.”135
If this hypothesis is indeed true, it has implications for
innovation externalities.136 Particular innovations that impact
133. Kyung Hee Kim, The Creativity Crisis: The Decrease in Creative Thinking Scores on the
Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking, 23 CREATIVITY RES. J. 285, 285, 293 (2011); see also Po
Bronson & Ashley Merryman, The Creativity Crisis, NEWSWEEK (July 10, 2010, 4:00 AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/creativity-crisis-74665 (discussing the study).
134. Kim, supra note 133, at 292.
135. Id. More completely, Kim writes:
It could be speculated children are learning to interact in more impersonal ways,
as they are more dependent on current technologies to communicate, perhaps
because these technologies lack person to person, verbal and other interpersonal
communicative signals. Technologies can enhance creativity and are useful tools
for the creative process; however, some aspects of technologies may hinder the
development of a child’s creative personality.
136. Innovation is a concept distinct from creativity: while creativity is generally
thought of as a characteristic people exhibit to greater or lesser degrees based on their
circumstances and individual capacities, innovation is understood as the process by which
creative ideas are converted into new products and services in the marketplace. Akbar Fadee
& Haitham Obaid Abd Alzahrh, Explaining the Relationship Between Creativity, Innovation and
Entrepreneurship, INT’L J. ECON., MGMT. & SOC. SCI., Dec. 2014, at 1. Nevertheless, because
innovation generally relies on creativity as the raw material for its workings, see id. at 3
(referring to the “creative people . . . which are the source of innovation”), most scholars
believe (and empirical research supports the idea, Hessamoddin Sarooghi, Dirk Libaers &
Andrew Burkemper, Examining the Relationship Between Creativity and Innovation: A
Meta-Analysis of Organizational, Cultural, and Environmental Factors, 30 J. BUS. VENTURING 714,
714 (2015) (finding in a meta-analysis “a strong positive relationship between creativity and
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creativity impose negative externalities on other innovators who
use these innovations, leading to their reduced ability to be creative
and develop truly innovative advances going forward.
III. IMPLICATIONS
A. Implications for Innovation Subsidies
The conventional wisdom in the innovation literature has been
that innovation imposes a positive externality (or spillover) on
other innovators, while the negative externalities it imposes—like
pollution—are borne by the general population rather than
innovators specifically.
This conventional wisdom about innovation’s externalities has
given rise to a general consensus on the appropriate policy
response. According to this consensus, the positive externality on
innovators—which may lead to suboptimal levels of innovation
because present innovators cannot capture the full value of their
innovations137—can be addressed through innovation subsidies
like grants, tax breaks, and IP, which will help innovators capture
the full value of their innovations and thereby encourage them
to innovate.138 The negative externalities, meanwhile, can be
addressed through targeting the externality-imposing innovations
directly through taxation.139 Ideally, this policy strategy would play
out as follows: technology-neutral innovation subsidies like IP and
grants would encourage innovation across the board, while
taxation of particular externality-imposing innovations (like
polluting innovations) would correct for this particular externality
by forcing innovators who innovate in this space to internalize the
externalities their activities generate.140 An important feature of this

innovation”)) that innovation generally requires some level of creativity. See, e.g., Fadee &
Alzahrh, supra; Sarooghi et al., supra. Andrew Marshall, an innovation consultant, describes
the relationship thusly: “Creativity is the price of admission, but it’s innovation that pays the
bills.” Andrew C. Marshall, There’s a Critical Difference Between Creativity and Innovation, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 10, 2013, 3:19 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/difference-betweencreativity-and-innovation-2013-4. Anything that negatively impacts creativity will therefore
also negatively impact innovation.
137. Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 3, at 390–91. But see Frischmann & Lemley, supra
note 21 (arguing that it is not necessary for innovators to capture the full value of their
innovations in order to achieve optimal levels of innovation).
138. Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 3, at 390–91.
139. Id.
140. See id.
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strategy is that it treats innovation’s positive and negative
externalities as separable,141 in part because they operate in
different domains and on distinct categories of third parties. The
assumption is that innovation’s positive externalities are generated
by innovation writ large and therefore can and should be addressed
via broad innovation-promoting subsidies. Innovation’s negative
externalities, meanwhile (according to the conventional wisdom),
are confined to particular harms, like pollution, imposed by specific
types of innovations; because they do not arise from or directly
affect the broader innovation landscape, they can be addressed in a
more targeted way.
This assumption of separability is suspect, however.142 For
example, in the context of polluting technologies, Liscow and
Karpilow have explained how innovation snowballing means that
certain innovations—including polluting innovations—will
become exponentially more valuable to develop in a way that
targeted taxation of these innovations does not adequately
address.143 More generally, the fact that innovation imposes
negative externalities on innovation and innovators means that the
effects of innovation’s positive and negative externalities on
innovation—and how policymakers choose to address them—
should be considered as a whole.
Specifically, under the conventional wisdom just discussed,
policymakers should grant innovation subsidies to innovators to
help them internalize the spillovers their activities generate for
other innovators, thereby providing them with optimal innovation
incentives by allowing them to capture the full value of their
innovations. But what is this “full value”? As the thinking goes, it
is the value the innovators are able to capture through traditional
market-based activities, plus the uncaptured “social value”—or
spillovers—the innovation generates, with one beneficiary of these
spillovers being other innovators.
What this story misses, however, is that innovators are not only
generating positive externalities for other innovators. They are also
generating negative externalities for other innovators—by creating
path dependencies, contributing to anti-innovation norms, and, in
many cases, developing innovations that harm the collective

141. Id. at 390.
142. Id. at 390–92.
143. Id. at 392–93.
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potential for creativity. Thus, the full “social value” of their
innovations might be significantly less than currently recognized.
The more accurate calculation of social value would be the
uncaptured spillovers for other innovators minus the uninternalized negative externalities imposed on other innovators.
1. Implications: Level of Subsidy
What does this mean for innovation subsidies? For one thing, it
implies that these subsides need not be as robust as the
conventional wisdom suggests in order to achieve optimal levels of
innovation.
This
conclusion
is
consistent
with
the
recommendations of those who have called into question a major
assumption underlying the conventional wisdom—that it is
necessary for innovators to capture the full value of their
innovations in order to incentivize them to innovate. According to
Frischmann and Lemley, this assumption is incorrect.144 Instead,
they argue that an expected positive return on investment provides
a sufficient incentive to innovate.145 Even if one does not agree with
Frischmann and Lemley, however, and believes that full
internalization of externalities is required, once the negative
externalities of innovation are recognized and accounted for, the
total amount of “value” to be made up via innovation subsidies
should be significantly reduced.
2. Implications: Type of Subsidy
Secondly, the current thinking is that strong IP rights are one of
the most efficient ways to help innovators internalize the
externalities imposed by their innovations.146 This is because IP
operates on a market mechanism that allows the market (which
incorporates the preferences of billions of people) to determine the
“true” value of the innovation rather than leaving that decision to
government officials who have much less information.147 However,
a recognition of innovation’s negative externalities calls this
thinking into question. These externalities may in fact operate in
ways such that market signals do not serve to adequately address
them. For example, although certain innovations may impose
144.
145.
146.
147.

Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 21, at 276.
Id.
Id. at 263.
Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 3, at 428–30.
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significant negative innovation externalities by reducing the
collective capacity for creative thought, history has demonstrated
that the demand for these kinds of innovations—innovations like
smartphones and the digital software that runs on them—is high.
Market-based mechanisms like IP, therefore, by providing a strong
pecuniary incentive to produce these types of innovations may not
adequately account for the negative externalities these
innovations generate.148
One alternative mechanism for granting innovation subsidies is
provided in the form of government grants. Grants differ from IP
in that they generally take a much more interested role in
determining what innovation to promote. While IP relies on private
innovators to choose what to work on based on the predicted ex post
market reward, government grants provide money to innovators ex
ante to cover the costs of particular innovative projects. The
government thus plays a big role in determining up front what
innovation will be produced with scarce grant funding.
In the legal innovation scholarship, at least some of the
literature comparing grant incentives to other innovation
incentives like IP regards the ex ante government allocation
mechanism of grants as a bug rather than a feature.149 The problem
with this mechanism, according to these scholars, is that the
government (which makes the funding decisions) is generally less
well informed, and thus less able to predict a priori what
innovations are desirable,150 compared to private market actors.151
Private actors are thus generally in a better position to make
decisions about which innovations to pursue.152
However, the extent to which one agrees with this critique
depends in part on one’s definition of “desirable.” If it is grounded
in market value, then it’s likely correct that market actors will have

148. Liscow and Karpilow also describe how because of path dependencies, certain
innovations which impose significant negative externalities might nevertheless have high
market value. This means that IP will provide a strong incentive to develop these particular
innovations, despite the fact that their true social value might be low relative to other
innovations. Id. at 428–30.
149. W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 9–10 (2019).
150. See, e.g., Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of
U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 353 (2000) (“[T]he selection process for
grants relies on the government’s ability to assess the desirability of a project when compared
with an array of others . . . .”).
151. See Price, supra note 149, at 9–14 (summarizing the argument).
152. Id.
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more information on this front than government bureaucrats and
will thus be better equipped to make efficient innovation
decisions.153 But if one’s definition of desirable takes into account
social welfare considerations beyond market value, grants might
have an advantage on this front, because they allow for the explicit
weighing of these considerations, prompting projects to go forward
that might not otherwise come into being because market-based
systems like IP do not provide adequate incentives to pursue them.
A number of commentators have in fact noted that grants might be
useful in spurring socially valuable innovations that may not be
adequately incentivized by IP—innovations like advances in
healthcare quality154 or new therapy techniques.155
On the flip side, to the extent policymakers use the grant system
to explicitly consider questions of social value beyond market
value, the result will be a higher allocation of scarce resources to
high value projects and a correspondingly lower allocation to
projects that implicate social welfare concerns. Granting agencies
could thus consider the fact that certain types of innovations pose
a high risk of generating negative externalities for creativity and
innovation going forward and take this information into account
when making allocative decisions.
This analysis does not necessarily suggest that IP should be
jettisoned in favor of grants and other, more targeted subsidies like
tax breaks. But it does suggest that scholars and policymakers could
spend more time (as many are beginning to do) thinking about how
to address the negative externalities innovation imposes on other
innovators, rather than just assuming that IP and the invisible hand
of the market will lead to optimal innovation outcomes. This point
is explored in more detail in section B.

153. See, e.g., Peter Lee, Social Innovation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 52 (2014)
(“[G]overnments are notoriously poor at ‘picking winners.’ Contrary to the distributed
information efficiencies of the market, public funding requires a centralized authority to
make broad investment decisions with limited information.”). But see Price, supra note 149,
at 20–32 (pushing back against this argument and pointing out that the government funding
process is in fact quite sophisticated and might be better than most people assume—and not
necessarily worse than IP—at selecting desirable projects).
154. Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 26, at 1952–53.
155. Lee, supra note 153, at 17–19, 47–52.
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B. Theoretical Implications
In addition to practical implications for how policymakers
think about policy responses to innovation’s externalities, the
hypothesis presented here—that innovation imposes negative
externalities on other innovators—also has implications for how
scholars think about promoting innovation. Specifically, it should
cause scholars to think more deeply about the types of innovation
our policies encourage, rather than assuming that any and all
innovation is “good” innovation. Even more fundamentally, it calls
into question certain philosophical foundations on which this oftmade assumption—that all innovation is good innovation—rests.
1. What Innovation Should Be Encouraged?
The notion that innovation may impose negative externalities
on other innovators, thereby impacting their ability to continue to
produce high levels of innovation, ties into a broader literature
emphasizing the social (rather than just the market) value of
particular innovations. In general, legal and economic innovation
scholars tend to assume that almost all innovation is good
innovation from a social welfare perspective because it fosters
economic growth, which in turn produces wealth and raises the
standard of living.156 As discussed above, this optimistic and
laissez-faire approach toward innovation is reflected in one of the
primary mechanisms for promoting innovation in the U.S.: IP.157
156. See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 1, at 10; NELSON, supra note 1, at 31 (“Virtually all
scholars of productivity growth now agree on the central role of technological advance.”);
Romer, supra note 1, at 63–64.
157. Under the dominant law and economics theory of IP, which motivates many of the
doctrines and policies embedded in U.S. patent and copyright regimes, IP—by giving timelimited exclusive rights to the creators of new products and ideas—provides incentives to
create things that would otherwise not come into being due to free-rider problems arising
from the public goods nature of intellectual products. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A.
Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1580 (2003) (discussing the “public
goods nature of inventions that are expensive to produce but easy to appropriate”). The
theory assumes that any social costs incurred by IP in the form of deadweight losses should
be outweighed by the social gains—in the form of “progress” via economic growth and some
of the more particular benefits mentioned—the incentivized innovation brings. See, e.g.,
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 839, 871-79 (1990). Although patent and copyright regimes have certain prerequisites
for acquiring rights—including, in copyright, that a creation have some degree of originality,
and in patent, that an invention be new, nonobvious, and useful—in theory, IP rights are
available to any creation that meets these requirements. In other words, no government
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Pushing back against this narrative, some IP and innovation
scholars have argued against the assumption that any innovation
that comes into being, simply by virtue of the fact that it was
produced, will have a net positive effect on social welfare. For
example, Ofer Tur-Sinai has asserted that equating market value
with social value, as western IP regimes implicitly do, is an
oversimplification that may lead society to incur IP’s social costs for
innovations that contribute little to—and indeed may detract
from—social welfare.158 Tur-Sinai offers as a prime example
“positional goods” meant primarily to signal status. While there
might be significant profit to be gained from these goods, in part
because people expect these goods to boost their well-being, the
actual impact on individual well-being, and thus on social welfare
more broadly, is likely much lower than the projection on which
consumers base their willingness-to-pay.159 On the flip side, some
scholars, including Tur-Sinai, Brett Frischmann, Amy Kapczynski, and
Talha Syed have argued that IP, with its focus on market value,
provides inadequate incentives to produce high-social-value goods
with low market value,160 like certain drugs that would
entity is deciding a priori whether a particular creation will be socially beneficial and
therefore deserving of IP rights. The thought, instead, is that the market will sort it out:
creations that promise to have high market value will offer a bigger carrot to potential
creators, since the reward IP provides comes from being able to charge supercompetitive
prices for these goods. Ofer M. Tur-Sinai, Technological Progress and Well-Being, 48 LOY. U.
CHI. L. J. 145, 155 (2016) (“Roughly speaking, the higher the market demand is likely to be
for a future technology, the stronger the incentive the patent system provides to develop
it.”). Being able to collect supercompetitive prices for a banana slicer or a goldfish walker, see
Roy, supra note 40, for example, may result in little gain, while having that privilege over a
blockbuster drug could lead to billions of dollars of profit. See, e.g., Jaime E. Moss, The
Implications of the Supreme Court’s Decision Regarding Labeling and Liability of Generic Drugs, 35
THOMAS JEFFERSON L. REV. 45, 57 (2012) (“Of the $860 billion in sales produced by
pharmaceutical industries throughout the world in 2010, $295 billion of the sales were
comprised of 133 [patented] blockbuster drugs.”). Creators will thus be pushed towards the
latter type of invention and away from the former. Tur-Sinai, supra, at 149.
158. Tur-Sinai, supra note 157, at 149 (“Under [the law and economics] perception of
well-being, the concept of technological progress that the state ought to promote is rather
simplistic—it includes those future goods that current market participants would value
most . . . . [But] there are good reasons to suspect that the patent system provides an
overincentive to develop, produce, and disseminate certain innovations with a relatively low
social value.”).
159. Id. at 170–71.
160. BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED
RESOURCES 109 (2012) (discussing how IP regimes provide inadequate incentives for
“various socially desirable intellectual goods”); Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 26, at 1905–
06 (discussing IP’s “appropriability” problem, wherein IP under-incentivizes creations
whose value cannot be fully appropriated by the creator).
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benefit primarily poor populations161 or technological solutions to
climate change.162
Taking the argument one step further, Estelle Derclaye has
proposed that the larger idea of technological “progress” on which
the IP system rests is itself flawed,163 in part because it assumes all
such progress will make humanity better off. In Dercalye’s view,
this assumption is not only unproven, it is very likely simply untrue
in many instances.164 As she points out:
The simple examples of the two World Wars, pollution, and
global warming are enough to prove the point: knowledge,
science, and technological progress have both positive and
negative consequences. However, people still believe in the idea
that progress will generate positive results. The belief that
technological progress will, by definition, increase well-being
includes the corresponding belief that innovation is good by
definition too.165

As Declaye acknowledges, she is by no means the first to make
this point. The recognition that technological progress is not
necessarily synonymous with well-being has its roots in the
philosophy literature dating back to the nineteenth century.166 Yet
despite Margaret Chon questioning the concept of “progress” in the
IP context in her seminal 1993 article Postmodern Progress:
Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power,167 the idea has been
161. Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to get Beyond Intellectual Property
Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 996–99 (stating that “the poor . . . are so poor that they
make up very little of an expected market for an innovation[,]” and pointing out that in those
cases where they make up the entire market for an innovation, the innovation is unlikely to
be produced).
162. Ofer Tur-Sinai, Patents and Climate Change: A Skeptic’s View, 48 ENV’T L. 211, 213
(2018) (arguing that “patents most likely underperform—in various important ways—in
fostering environmental innovation and thus cannot be trusted to adequately promote the
development of climate change technologies”).
163. Derclaye, supra note 28, at 498 (“[T]he assumptions on which the idea of progress—
and therefore, intellectual property rights—rest are deeply flawed.”).
164. Id. at 522–23.
165. Id. at 522.
166. Id. at 524.
167. Margaret Chon, Postmodern Progress: Reconsidering in the Copyright and Patent
Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 100 (1993) (arguing that the IP system is rooted in a modern
view of progress, while a postmodern view (for which she advocates) of progress “rejects
the view of ‘progress’ as a liberating upward trajectory”); see also Simone A. Rose, The
Supreme Court and Patents: Moving Toward a Postmodern Vision of “Progress”?, 23 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1197, 1221, 1234–38 (2013) (discussing Chon’s article and
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slow to make its way into legal and economic treatments of
innovation, not to mention the public consciousness.168 For many
innovation scholars and laypeople, all innovation is progress, and
progress is inherently “good.”
The hypothesis presented here—that certain innovations, or the
norms and path dependencies that arise around them, may impose
negative externalities by impacting other innovators’ collective
ability to continue to produce high levels of innovation—relates to
this literature in that it offers a specific example of innovation
having potential negative welfare effects. But, unlike the classic
examples of negative externalities imposed by innovation, like the
consequences of weapons technology or polluting technology,169
the negative externality identified here is unique because it does
not rely on a value-based definition of “progress” not commonly
accepted by legal and economic innovation scholars. Instead, it
strikes at the very heart of what progress means to these scholars—the
perpetuation of social-welfare-enhancing economic growth through
the positive feedback cycle of innovation begetting innovation.
These scholars may have previously been unconcerned with the
question of innovation’s negative externalities because they reject a
broader notion of progress that incorporates values beyond
economic growth—in their view, all innovation, to the extent that
it promotes economic growth, is good innovation. But the evidence
presented here suggests that even under this seemingly allinclusive definition of good innovation, some innovations, and the
infrastructures and processes that give rise to them, may be less
than good, in the sense that they inhibit future innovation and
therefore stall the positive feedback loop of progress and economic
growth embodied in the conventional wisdom. The upshot is that
innovation’s negative externalities should be a matter of concern
for all innovation scholars—whether they ascribe to a value-based
definition of progress that incorporates multiple ideals, or the more
traditional view that progress and economic growth are synonymous.

arguing that the Supreme Court erroneously views the Constitution’s mandate that IP
promote the progress of science and the useful arts through a modernist lens that emphasizes
economic growth rather than a postmodernist lens that considers other values like
sustainability and environmental concerns).
168. See Declaye, supra note 28, at 524–25.
169. See id. at 522.
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2. Philosophical Conceptions of Innovation
As is evident from the aphorism “innovation begets
innovation,” the legal and economic innovation literature tends to
make certain assumptions about innovation. Specifically, the
conventional wisdom depends on a conception of innovation as a
passive resource, available for society to use as it sees fit to produce
yet further innovation. Under the conventional wisdom, when an
innovation is created it begets innovation as people use it to be
more productive and do new things they couldn’t do before. In
other words, innovation begets innovation when people exert
their agency on the object of innovation in ways that lead to
more innovation.
But this view of innovation as passive tool to be used in the
ways that best suit society’s thirst for more innovation overlooks an
important truth about innovation: it doesn’t always work solely in
the ways society wants it to. The nature of innovation means that
there will often be unintended consequences. Some are quickly and
easily discovered. But some might be more subtle and take longer
to reveal themselves. In this case, some of these consequences—that
is, reduced ability to innovate in the long term—might in fact
directly undermine society’s goal of promoting innovation.
There is an additional flaw in the conception of innovation as
object, available for society to act upon as agent as it sees fit to
produce yet further innovation. This flaw lies in the assignment of
subject and object status to society and innovation, respectively. In
the society-innovation equation, we perhaps rightly think of
ourselves as the actors and innovation as the acted-upon. But this
is an oversimplification. The truth is that innovation also acts on
society in ways we may not fully recognize, changing our
behaviors, our preferences, and even our cognitive capacities.
A related point has been made by Dan Burk in the context of
artificial intelligence (AI) and algorithms. As algorithms have
become more sophisticated, incorporating elements of AI and
machine learning, legal scholars have been eager to put them to use
to solve a variety of law and policy challenges.170 Burk points out,
170. See, e.g., Cary Coglianse & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision
Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1152–55 (2017) (concluding that we
should be “reasonably optimistic about machine learning and the instrumental role it can
play in making a more promising for administrative government”); Ariel Porat & Lior J.
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however, that the idea of deploying algorithms in various legal
contexts—to, say, determine default contract terms based on party
preferences,171 or decide what uses of another’s copyrighted work
are legally permissible172—while attractive, overlooks an important
reality. According to Burk, the algorithms we use to measure
personal preferences and conformance with legal standards will
inevitably begin to shape those very preferences and standards.173
One way in which they might do this is by altering incentives. For
example, an algorithm that tries to determine permissible uses of
copyrighted videos posted to YouTube by non-owners will
inevitably rely on metrics that are somewhat simpler than the
complex legal standard of fair use. As people interact with this
algorithm, they will come to learn what “passes” as fair use to the
algorithm and what does not, and will adjust their behavior
according to these algorithmically generated incentives.174 In turn,
this widespread behavioral change will alter peoples’ views about
what the legal standard is and should be; and, given that the law is
a social construct that takes its cues from social norms,175 it will likely
result over time in a modification of the legal standard itself.176
The philosophy of innovation literature has also recognized this
dilemma. Many scientists and engineers subscribe to the idea that
Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417
1440–53 (2014) (arguing that data mining algorithms could be used to help tailor and
improve the functioning of the legal system in diverse areas such as contracts, organ
donation, medical malpractice, landlord-tenant law, and labor law).
171. See Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 170, at 1440–45.
172. Dan Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, 86 CHI. L. REV. 283, 288–94 (2019).
173. Id. at 302 (discussing how algorithms, deployed in the legal context, “produce
recursive biases that change public practice and so change social meaning”).
174. Id. at 302–03.
175. See, e.g., John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm
Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 543 (arguing that copyright law does not function effectively
when it diverges significantly from social norms); Gregory Mandel, The Role of Public
Perception in the Rule of Law, 11 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 1, 3 (2018) (“The rule of law will be
hindered when there is a disconnect between the law on the one hand, and the public
consensus or understanding on the other hand.”); Daron Acemoglu & Matthew O. Jackson,
Social Norms and the Enforcement of Laws (Stan. L. & Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 466, 2016)
(creating an economic model suggesting “that when laws conflict with prevailing norms . . .
most people prefer to break the law.”).
176. Burk, supra note 172, at 303–05 (describing how such a change actually occurred,
in the analog context, via the development and widespread use of simplified guidelines to
help stakeholders evaluate fair use of copyrighted educational materials. As people and
organizations relied on the guidelines to guide their behavior, they became the de facto
“law” by which these groups governed themselves; they even began to be cited in legal briefs
and court opinions as evidence that a particular use was fair).
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innovation is “value neutral”177 precisely because, like legal and
economic innovation scholars, they view it as an object rather than
an agent. If innovation is merely an object to be acted upon,
it cannot be normatively “good” or “bad” in and of itself; it
acquires normative shading only as human agents use it in good or
bad ways.178
Many philosophers, however, contest the value-neutrality
hypothesis. One philosophical argument against the value
neutrality of innovation proceeds along the same lines as Burk’s
concern with algorithmic solutions to legal problems. According to
this argument, innovation can, and often does, change peoples’
incentives in ways that lead to changes in behavior, which in turn
will affect society in good or bad ways.179 Innovation cannot,
therefore, be normatively neutral because it is responsible for these
societal effects.180 The argument also suggests, contrary to the
conception of innovation as static object, that particular innovations
“act” on us in some sense, because they lead actors to behave
differently than they would have prior to the innovation’s inception.
Granted, merely changing an individual’s incentives is a
relatively weak form of action, and bestowing agent status on
innovation for this reason is perhaps an overreaction of sorts. After
all, individuals are still acting autonomously according to their
individual utility calculations; innovation has merely changed the
utility of various options. But there is a stronger philosophical
protest to the value-neutrality hypothesis. It posits that innovation
is not value neutral because it is itself autonomous. This
“technological autonomy” hypothesis was first formulated by
French philosopher Jacques Ellul, who argued that “the
177. David R. Morrow, When Technologies Makes Good People Do Bad Things: Another
Argument Against the Value-Neutrality of Technologies, 20 SCI. ENG’R ETHICS 329, 329–30 (2014).
178. See id. at 331 (“[T]he core idea [of the value neutrality of technology] is that the
effects of any technology depend on the way technology is used, which is determined by its
(potential) users, rather than by the technology itself. Therefore, if a technology has bad
effects, it must be because its users have used it in bad ways.”).
179. Id. at 334–35. Morrow gives as an example a theater-lover who must choose
between attending a local community production and traveling for three hours to see a
Broadway show. Depending on the person’s preferences, she might gain more net utility
from seeing the lower quality local production because of the disutility incurred by the long
travel time. The advent of an innovation like a high-speed train that greatly reduces travel
time, however, might change her utility calculation, leading her to modify her behavior and
go see the Broadway play.
180. Id. at 333 (“[T]echnologies affect individuals’ behavior and, through their
behavior, affect society for good or for ill.”).
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technological system exists beyond the (actual or possible) control
of any individual and/or group of people.”181 According to Ellul
and political scientist Langdon Winner, who elaborated on Ellul’s
ideas, the sum of society’s modern technology forms a system so
complex that it essentially (if not literally) has a mind of its own,
following its own rules and directing society along the paths it sets
for itself.182 Under this view, the proposal that innovation is value
neutral is incorrect because innovation is itself an agent that has
“cease[d] to be primarily a means or a tool and beg[un] to become
an end . . . . [F]ollowing a technological logic, increasingly
independent of human desires.”183
The hypothesis presented here—that innovation imposes
negative externalities by creating path dependencies, social norms,
and even cognitive effects that impact future actions—is consistent
with both the mild and strong refutations of the value-neutrality
hypothesis, and also strengthens and expands on them. First,
consistent with the mild argument against value neutrality, it
confirms that particular innovations do in fact change the course of
human behavior. But rather than doing so simply by altering the
utility of various options, the hypothesis suggests they might also
do so by altering people—their biology, and, as a consequence, their
preferences and capacities. Second, consistent with the strong,
technological autonomy refutation of value neutrality, the
argument presented here confirms that innovation can indeed be
thought of as an agent that acts on humans, largely independent of
their desires.184 But the ways in and extent to which it does so may
have surprised even Ellul. Beyond simply moving society as a
whole in particular directions via path-dependency and social
norms, certain innovations may also act on society by modifying
individual capacities to think and act in particular ways.
Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger have recently explored this
topic in detail in their book Re-Engineering Humanity. In it, they
181. J. Craig Hanks & Emily Kay Hanks, From Technological Autonomy to Technological
Bluff: Jacques Ellul and Our Technological Condition, 25 HUM. AFFS. 460, 462 (2015).
182. See id. at 464 (“The various large technological systems follow their own rules and,
at times, may conflict with one another, but are not truly controlled by the state, rather the
state is limited by the content and direction of technological systems and imperatives. For
example, once we have dispersed single-family ways of living, distant from commerce,
industry, and education, then some forms of transportation become rational and others
(subways, for instance) do not.”).
183. Id. at 464.
184. See id. at 464.
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argue that many contemporary innovations are changing the very
nature of humanity by rendering the individuals who use these
innovations more machine-like in their thinking and behavior. 185
Accumulating evidence supports Frishmann and Selinger’s thesis:
for example, a study from Harvard researchers recently concluded
that predictive text systems change the way people write in ways
that essentially render their writing more machine-like.186 The
psychology and neuroscience evidence presented here also
supports Frishmann and Selinger’s conclusions.
As interesting as this theoretical debate is on its own merits, for
those more practically minded, it is useful because the framing will
inform what policy responses, if any, policymakers believe to be
appropriate. As Ellul and Winner have both argued, believing in
accordance with the conventional wisdom that innovation is
merely a passive tool “misleads people about modern technological
systems . . . [and] supports naive and self-serving justification of
the present state and future direction of technology.”187 In other
words, if we accept, as many innovation scholars from the legal and
economic traditions do, that innovation begets innovation in a
positive feedback loop, and that most innovation has at least the
potential to enhance social welfare, the primary concern will be—
as it has been—to ensure that innovation continues to occur at high
levels. If, however, scholars recognize that innovation imposes
negative externalities that may act on us in ways that may halt or
slow down this positive feedback loop, they may be motivated to
think more carefully about how to design particular innovation
infrastructures and promote and use the innovations that result.
CONCLUSION
Innovation scholars tend to think of innovation as providing
positive externalities or spillovers for other innovators, while
generating negative externalities not directly related to future
innovation. This article argues that in fact, innovation may generate
significant negative externalities for other innovators, and
describes three mechanisms by which it does so: path
185. BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 1, 10
(Cambridge University Press 2018).
186. Leah Burrows, Predictive Text Systems Change What We Write, HARV. SCH. ENG’G &
APPLIED SCIS. (May 11, 2020), https://www.seas.harvard.edu/news/2020/05/predictivetext-systems-change-what-we-write (reporting on the study).
187. Hanks & Hanks, supra note 181, at 463.
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dependencies, anti-innovation norms, and cognitive effects that
reduce creative thinking.
Recognizing these negative externalities not only calls into
question the dominant narrative of innovation perpetually giving
rise to more innovation in a positive feedback loop; it also has
practical implications for the best ways to address innovation’s
externalities. The view espoused by many is that policy treatment
of innovation’s positive and negative externalities is separable,
with innovation’s positive externalities best addressed through
innovation subsidies, and its negative externalities best addressed
through taxation. But this view fails to account for the fact that
innovation’s negative externalities also operate on other
innovators, and so may not be easily separated from innovation’s
spillovers. Further, innovation’s spillovers for other innovators
may not be as expansive as often assumed, precisely because of the
countervailing negative externalities innovation imposes on other
innovators. For innovation policy, this suggests that innovation
subsidies designed to account for innovation’s spillovers, like IP,
grants, and tax breaks, should also account for innovation’s
negative externalities, and need not be as robust as the conventional
wisdom dictates.
On a higher level, a recognition of innovation’s hidden negative
externalities, and how they operate, challenges a common
philosophical conception of innovation in law and economics
circles wherein innovation is viewed as a passive tool to be used at
society’s convenience to produce yet more socially beneficial
innovation. This challenge aligns with a growing movement of
innovation scholars concerned with the social welfare effects of
particular innovations. More particularly, it suggests that rather
than simply assuming all innovation is good from the standpoint
of perpetuating the positive feedback cycle of continued innovation
and economic growth, scholars would do well to recognize that
some innovations, and the institutions and infrastructures that
support them, can actually interrupt this cycle. Doing so, and
calibrating innovation policy accordingly, should result in a more
nuanced, humble, and sustainable approach to innovation.
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